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A B S T R A C T
In the recent past, the demand for massively multiplayer online role-
playing games, MMORPGs, has rapidly grown. MMORPGs are com-
plex software procuts with designed-for selfpreserving internal social
and economic systems. Through the occurrence of MMORPG-related
services and activities based on game-external interests, MMORPG-
internal markets are destabilized in a way that even threatens the
existance of the overarching MMORPG systems. In order to protect
the market integrity within MMORPG economies and stabilize their
internal markets, a mechanism is developed throughout this thesis
that connects in-game market activities to mandatory system-internal
investments, activities, and efforts.. . .
Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
Die Nachfrage nach Onlinerollenspielen, MMORPGs, hat in jüngster
Vergangenheit stark zugenommen. MMORPGs sind komplexe Software-
produkte mit sich darin befindenden selbstlaufenden und -erhaltenden
sozialen Systemen und Ökonomien. MMORPG-bezogene, jedoch auf
spielexternen Interessen basierende Dienstleistungen und Aktitivitäten
destabilisieren diese Systeme in einer Art und Weise, die sogar ihre
Existenz bedroht. Um die Integrität von Märkten in MMORPGs zu
schützen und um sie zu stabilisieren, wird ein Mechanismus entwick-
elt, der Marktaktivitäten im Spiel mit obligatorischem Aufwand und
notwendigen Aktivitäten innerhalb des Spielsystems verbindet.. . .
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 motivation
The market for MMORPGs, massively multiplayer online roleplaying
games, is a rapidly growing market with a current user base of at
least 17 million customers. While the market is currently dominated by
Blizzard Entertainment’s World of Warcraft, the competition for market
share grows more and more intense and many new MMORPG titles
are currently in development. (Woodcock, 2008, Chart 4,7)
MMORPGs are first and foremost software products and thus com-
plex systems. Their development and their maintenance require the
investment of a substantial amount of money. For their users, it takes
a substantial amount of time to adapt to them and learn how to use
them. The acquired knowledge and system-related skills are usually
intransferable and incompatible to other MMORPGs, which causes sub-
stantial lock-in effects, switching costs, and sunk costs for their users.
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999, p.11) The lock-in effect is further increased
by features provided by the systems, that is system-internal resources,
belongings, and measures, which will be described in further detail in
chapter 2.
In the recent past, so-called "‘Real Money Trade"’, RMT, services have
emerged that offer relief for the individual sunk costs and switching
costs for MMORPG users. To reduce the investment of time and effort
required to obtain a certain system-internal status, they offer both
system-related services and system-internal valuables. This is because
their opportunity costs to acquire them are smaller than the opportunity
costs of their customers. (Lehtiniemi, 2008, p.24) Imagine a company
offering to increase your amount of skymiles so that you can fly first
class whenever you finally have the time to air travel. These offered
services, however, have an impact on the quality of the MMORPG
systems.
MMORPGs are vast, diverse, and complex social systems. Via interac-
tion and communication within and about the system, system-related
and system-internal social networks and communities are formed, re-
sulting in positive network effects for their users. (Shapiro and Varian,
1999, p.13) To strengthen and retain community bonds, meaningful indi-
vidual contributions of the system users to their communities through
individual investment of time into the system are required. RMT ser-
vices adulterate the quality of the system-internal communities as they
use and congest the communities’ system-internal infrastructures with-
out contributing to them. Imagine exclusive skymiles membership clubs
in airports being unpleasantly overcrowded and noisy.
Within social systems, trade usually emerges with an according ex-
change of goods and services that are declared valuable within the sys-
tem by its members through a commonly accepted means of payment
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obtainable within the system. This also applies for MMORPGs. Within
them, there are vast, complex, and realistic economies. Through the
existance of RMT services, MMORPG users are no longer required to
obtain system-internal funds for in-game trading by investing time and
effort into the system as they may as well exchange system-external sur-
plus for system-internal valuables. That way, system-internal valuables
are no longer backed up by the aggregated individual contributions of
the users to the system and its communities, and system-internal com-
modities and measures are significantly devalued. Imagine an internet
forum where users pay others to increase their forum activity measure,
e.g. their amount of submitted forum threads. To accomplish that task,
the employed others spam the forum boards with generic messages.
That way, the expertise of the web forum and overall content quality
are reduced while actual expertise is drained away from them.
Last, MMORPGs are also games multiple users are simultaneously
connected to. Activities within game systems are usually restricted by
an overarching ruleset every user has to abide to to assure fair play,
fair competition, and overall stability of the game system. This cannot
be provided any longer if RMT services exist. RMT customers can
acquire a competitive advantage over players not using these services,
rendering the objective of fair competiton and the value of acquired
achievements meaningless. Imagine playing Monopoly with a few other
people of which one pays the player administering the bank $10 to get
handed out 50,000 Monopoly money.
RMT reduces the quality, stability, and integrity of MMORPG system
products. Investments made into the system by both their developers
and their users are devalued. This leads to two problems which will
be adressed within this thesis. From a business studies perspective,
RMT causes additional costs for MMORPG operators as they have to
perform and invest in activities to combat the negative effects of RMT
on their products and services. That poses threats to their profitability
and overall competitiveness on the MMORPG market. From an eco-
nomics perspective, system-internal MMORPG markets are destabilized
through so-called "‘MUDflation"’. The utility of users of MMORPG-
internal markets is greatly reduced as their investments and efforts into
and within the MMORPG economies are devalued.
In order to find a solution for the above described problems, Castranova
suggests a strategy of price control performed by the operators of
MMORPGs as they have total control over their product’s underlying
software code and may thus freely regulate market conditions within
their MMORPG’s economy. (Castronova, 2002, p.4) Within this thesis,
Castranova’s suggestion will be analyzed and evalued. In the end of this
thesis, a strategy will be presented that could solve the above described
problems for both MMORPG operators and the market stability of
MMORPG economies.
1.2 research objectives
Consequently, the main task for this thesis is as follows: to develop a
price control strategy for MMORPGs that greatly lessens or even pre-
vents the negative impacts of price instability and MUDflation within
MMORPGs. Price control only works, however, if it is accepted by the
1.3 thesis outline 3
MMORPG users. Thus, the customers’ system-internal economic inter-
ests are to be determined and respected. The MMORPGs are run by
private enterprises bound to the profitability constraint. Hence it has
to be kept sure that the applied price control strategy causes minimal
costs for the online world developers.
Consequently, several objects are to be investigated. Typical MMORPG
characteristics are to be identified and evaluated regarding their im-
plications for MMORPG economies. In order to identify and measure
investments made by MMORPG users into the MMORPG economy,
the derived economic variables are to be aggregated into a production
function applicable to online game world residents. It has then to be
determined in which way this production function is interfered with
through RMT and other system-external drivers.
It also has to be analyzed which effects these interferences cause to
both the online game world inhabitants and their operators. It shall
also be shown in which way MMORPG developers reacted upon the
derived interferences so far and if those applied strategies lead to the
desired results.
To generate a price control mechanism that is accepted by MMORPG
citizens, the players’ desires regarding production and consumption
within online game worlds are to be put under consideration. Conse-
quently, economic principles for MMORPGs are to be identified. Based
on these principles, a price control mechanism is to be developed that
meets both the financial interests of the MMORPG operators and the
economic gameplay interests of the online game world citizens.
To achieve the above mentioned goals, the historical method is used.
Available research on MMORPG economics is gathered, structured for
the purpose of this thesis, reviewed, and analyzed. A substantial part
of the resource material is contributed by professor E. Castranova who
has been investigating the economies of online game worlds for several
years now.
This thesis is focused on transactions of obtained in-game commodities
between users within MMORPG economies and according in-game mar-
ket prices. An additional thorough analysis of how in-game resources
are provided would go beyond the scope of this thesis.
1.3 thesis outline
This thesis consists of seven chapters. After arguing why the develop-
ment of a working price control mechanism is crucial for MMORPGs,
chapter 2 demonstrates the methodology of online game worlds. A
MMORPG is a computer-simulated environment 2.1 in a persistent 2.2
multi-user space 2.3, where shared and cooperative tasks 2.4 are carried
out by avatars, the players’ self-representations 2.5. The implications of
these characteristics regarding individual production and consumption
are presented in the according sections. Out of these implications, a
production function for MMORPG citizens is derived and explained in
detail 2.6.
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Disturbances of this production function are discussed in chapter 3.
MUDflation, a combination of simultaneous inflationary and defla-
tionary processes is described and available data on its severity given
3.1. Subsequently, motivations for deflationary 3.2 and inflationary 3.3
trade behavior are investigated. Sources of excess supply in money are
classified and analyzed in detail 3.3.1 to 3.3.3. Section 3.4 analyzes the
effects of MUDflation on the economic interests of and transactions
between the players within MMORPGs. In section 3.5, the effects of
MUDflation on the operators’ competiveness on the MMORPG market
will be adressed, consequences regarding operation costs 3.5.1 and
operation revenues 3.5.2 described.
According to the suggested counter strategy, the central theme of Chap-
ter 4 is price control. Section 4.1 gives an overview of price control
in the real world and discusses circumstances in which price control
was applied in the past. Subsequently, price control strategies executed
in online games, significant differences to real world application, and
their effects are described 4.2. All of them, however, cause undesirable
side effects. Central planning is not accepted by the players 4.2.1. A
system of supposedly balanced faucets and drains of commodities
and resources at most delays the occurance of MUDflation 4.2.2. Last,
customer service representative prosecution imposes a costly adminis-
trative burden on the MMORPG operators with only little to no effects
4.2.3.
To develop a price control mechanism that is generally accepted by the
MMORPG users, their interests as in-game consumers and producers
have to be respected. These interests are determined in chapter 5.
MMORPG developers seek a solution with very low administrative
costs and high efficiency to minimize their operation costs. MMORPG
inhabitants demand the assurance of a few economic principles equally
applicable to all players. Avatar diversity is required to allow every
player the selection of a meaningful in-game societal role 5.1. Equality
of opportunity is requested to exclude real life based and to glorify
online world based economic power and achievements 5.2. That power
is to be achieved by overcoming challenges imposed by and within the
MMORPG 5.3. To prevent punishment of in-game supply and demand
based inefficient choices for certain societal roles, the guarantee of
minimum rewards is requested 5.4.
Based on the principles of economic design in MMORPGs and the
theory of price control, a price control mechanism for MMORPGs will
be compiled in Chapter 6. It is argued why invariably all player-to-
player trade has to be mediated by an automated neutral authority
6.1. That mediation has to provide a minimum income level through
a global formula that determines the minimum value of each in-game
commodity 6.2. The actual market prices and all other significant trade
data, however, should cyclically be generated by the producers and con-
sumers within each MMORPG to warrant a monitored while still free
market economy 6.3. To prevent adulteration of the player-generated
market data, individual trade information has to be strictly limited to
the trade participants while interpersonal trade information has to be
kept undisclosed to all players 6.4. Section 6.5 illlustrates the deriving
price control mechanism step-by-step.
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Chapter 7 summarizes the results carried out throughout this thesis
7.1. Effects of the price control mechanism regarding welfare effects
7.2.1, effects on RMT 7.2.2, and player acceptance 7.2.3 are discussed in
section 7.2. Suggestions for future research are made 7.3. Final thoughts
of the author are provided at the end of this thesis 7.4.
1.4 original contributions
The original contributions of the thesis consist of the following key
aspects:
1. Combinations that cause price instability in MMORPGs are iden-
tified. Their effects are described in a comprehensible way to
demonstrate the urgency of a strategy that stabilizes MMORPG
in-game markets.
2. Threats to the profitability of MMORPG operation and to the
integrity of MMORPG economies are pointed out, limitations to
circumvent those threats provided.
3. A price control mechanism for MMORPGs is established and
illustrated that should
• reduce MMORPG operation costs through easy and auto-
mated use,
• enhance player-to-player trade,
• guarantee efficient price allocation and first degree price
discrimination,
• protect individually obtained MMORPG system internal
expertise and status, and
• help to stabilize MMORPG in-game markets regarding price
conditions.

2
M E T H O D O L O G Y O F M M O R P G S A N D E C O N O M I C
I M P L I C AT I O N S
In this chapter, an introduction to MMORPGs will be made based on
their typical characteristics. While available definitions, e.g. Bartle, 2003,
p.2,4 and Castranova, 2005b, p.4,7 vary slightly, it is mutually agreed to
that all MMORPGs share the following characteristics:
• computer-simulated environment,
• persistent world,
• multi-user space,
• shared competitive and/or cooperative tasks, and
• self-representation of each user through an avatar.
Those will be discussed in detail, combined with their individual con-
tributions to in-game production and consumption, in the following
sections 2.1 to 2.5. Based on the economic implications, an avatar pro-
duction function will be demonstrated in 2.6.
2.1 computer-simulated environment
Most online roleplaying games1 take place in environments that we are
somewhat used to from our real life existence. There are trees, roads,
wilderness, mostly dangerous natural wildlife, villages, cities, dens
and lairs. Sometimes, trees are replaced by enormous mushrooms and
instead of eagles and hawks, dragons and wyverns reign the sky.2 Laws
of physics and nature usually apply, albeit in a simplified way. If a
player jumps from a cliff and does not land in water, he may suffer
injuries he will need to recover from. If a steed or, well, a wolf, a rhino,
or a dragon turtle are used for travel, a player will reach his desired
destination faster. Scarce resources like herbs, ore, leather, cloth, meat,
fruits, and other commodities may be found within the game world
that can be used for production of goods and trading.3 The game world
is software-rendered textually, in 2D, or as mostly common today in
3D.
If the above described and to which degree it applies for a specific
game world depends on the entrepreneurial decision of its creators,
the MMORPG developers. This is because online roleplaying games
are computer-simulated. Every interaction between the users and the
MMORPG environment is computer-mediated by the underlying game
code. If a player wants to craft a sword, program code and database
1 Exceptions may be space-based MMORPGs like EVE Online.
2 Currently, more than 94% of all MMORPG market share takes place in a fantasy setting,
Woodcock (2008), Chart 8.
3 A more detailed description of initial gameplay, physics and resource interaction experi-
ences within MMORPGs can be found at (Castranova, 2005b, p.34-40).
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entries for its resource requirements, the process of production, game-
related rights of ownership, visual representation, limitation of us-
age etc. within the game have to exist ex ante. Anything within the
MMORPG is the result of the execution of software code based on
database entries. (Bartle, 2004, p.22f.); (Castranova, 2005b, p.7)
MMORPG users may only perform actions that the software code and
the hard-coded ruleset of the online world allow. This generally leads
to the players giving up some of their real-world freedoms and, in
exchange, being granted new freedoms and benefits. (Bartle, 2004, p.13)
In the real world, players may freely interact with a chicken, e.g. they
may try to chase it, lift it up, or imitate it. In a MMORPG, a chicken
may not react at all upon being chased. But, given that the underlying
code allows it, it may be attackable with e.g. very limited self-defense
routines.
This is also the case for all economic-motivated actions within the
MMORPG. In the above example, it might economic-wise only be
a good idea to raise and sell chicken for an in-game living if the
chicken raiser can protect his chickens from being attacked by other
creatures and players. Consequently, any economic action is subject
to an underlying hard-coded ruleset. All MMORPG users are bound
to those coded restrictions. The restrictions can be of great variety.
While a MMORPG may allow unlimited storage room for resources
and commodities, another MMORPG may limit the amount one can
carry by a certain attribute, e.g. the strength of the player’s in-game
character, leading to according economic consequences in terms of
transportation costs for their carriers. Code may also technically allow,
prevent, or outlaw theft, resulting in according economic implications
for the protection and handling of in-game property.
In the real world, certain acts, e.g. theft or murder, are regulated by
institutionally imposed and prosecuted law. They are technically possi-
ble, but severely punished upon detection. In MMORPGs, certain acts
and behavior can ex ante be completely excluded by code, e.g. a player
may only be allowed to try to pickpocket players from certain factions
or computer-controlled characters. This issue will be of further impor-
tance in Chapters 4 and 6. For now it suffices to state that anything a
player can do within an online game world is based on the code-wise
allowance of its developers. This limitation of available interactions
with system-internal commodities and activities accordingly influences
their in-game evaluation.
2.2 persistent world
MMORPGs worlds are not only computer-simulated, they are also
persistent. In a single-player role-playing computer game, one can
usually save the current state of the game world. Upon return, the
previous state is loaded and the player can continue where he left
the game. This is not the case for MMORPGs. Persistent means that
the game world continues to exist and changes while a user is not
connected to the game.
This is, in terms of economics, important since it ensures a more or
less stable persistence of personal belongings. If the game only allows
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theft of a player’s belongings if that player is logged in to the game,
a player can be sure that his possessions at the time of logging out
will still be there when he relogs into the game.(Castranova, 2005b,
p.80f) Accordingly, commodities acquired within a MMORPG retain
emotions and in-game resources and effort connected to them and gain
a long-term meaningfulness. Having things within the game results
in personal value attached to them and thus the sense of personal
accomplishment and evaluation.
The characteristic of persistence also leads to real-time interactions. If a
certain commodity or resource within an MMORPG world can by code
only be acquired at night and a user would like to acquire that certain
commodity, he will need to log into the game at MMORPG night time.4
This is likewise the case for certain transactions between the player
and the computer-simulated environment: if a computer-controlled
character5 is only willing to buy certain ingredients harvested by the
user at a certain time, the user will need to trade with that NPC at
that particular in-game time if he wants to meet that specific game-side
provided demand.
If a player decides to raise chicken, and the chicken have a coded rate
of reproduction, the player may log out of the game having 15 chicken.
Due to persistance, the chicken population continues to grow. Upon
return a day later, his chicken population may have risen to 25. It
may, however, also have vanquished because he forgot to lock up the
hen house and all chicken were eaten by computer-controlled foxes.
The chickens may also have vanquished because they were not fed
within the last 12 hours, or because all his chickens were killed by
other players. The later may be the case because MMORPGs are also
multi-user spaces.
2.3 multi-user space
MMORPGs allow the simultaneous connection of multiple users to
the persistent and computer-simulated game world. Due to different
preferences concerning the use of their playtime, MMORPG users
will spend their available time in a different way. Some may want to
accumulate in-game commodities, while others prefer to communicate
with other players. Some just wander around looking for adventures.
(Yee, 2006, p.5)
Through their individual way of interaction with the MMORPG, through
consumption of certain game content, and consequently accumulation
of playstyle-related commodities, the users express their own personal-
ity. (Lastowka and Hunter, 2003, p.64) Through communication with
other players and thus social relations, they will compare the outcome
of their time spent with each other. (Lehtiniemi, 2008, p.36) That way,
they can increase their relative social in-game status towards other
players. If a player feels that he lags behind other players in general
or players of his individual playstyle, he can set himself goals to catch
up. Social value, relative comparison with each other, and societal
evaluation are added to the personal value of acquired commodities.
4 Due to being computer-simulated, time of night within a MMORPG and in real time
need not necessarily overlap.
5 Also called NPC, non-player character.
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For example, upon raising 1,000 chickens a player is granted the title
the Chicken Breeder that he may display to other players. In addition to
the personal value and invested effort he connects to that title, he can
now receive additional social value through the admiration of other
players. Players who are not yet entitled the title are given a potential
goal for personal in-game accomplishment.
Professor Castranova made an effort to convert the value of commodi-
ties obtained by EverQuest6 players to an hourly wage. Based on dollar
to platinum7 exchange rates, he concluded that in 2001, EverQuest play-
ers made $3.42 per hour and respectively generated $14.15 of utility per
hour. (Castronova, 2001, p.35f.) The accuracy of this wage, however, is
arguable. Non-monetizable values are not factored in, e.g. the duration
or challenge it took a player to obtain a certain commodity. It relies
on self-reported, not factual data. Also, the exchange rate of platinum
to dollar rather represents a grey or black market but a free market
platinum price. Even the 2005 introduced official exchange platform
for EverQuest currency and commodities, StationExchange8, does not
provide accurate information as the exchange rates do not account for
the social costs caused by the exchange which will be discussed in
further detail in chapter 3.
Up to this point, a MMORPG is a computer-simulated game that keeps
running when a player is not connected to it. Players may acquire
commodities through own means and brag about them to other players
by the use of communication tools like chat or voice chat to further
increase the personal valuation of acquired commodities.
2.4 shared competitive and/or cooperative tasks
In addition to the above characteristics, MMORPGs are also shared
places where players can interact with each other real-time. While
hunting deer or more dangerous beasts to obtain their hides that are
used for e.g. crafting leather armor, a player may encounter another
player who set out into the forest for the same purpose. Based on
their personal desires and playstyle preferences, they can choose one of
several options.
They can become competitors. They are both hunting for a scarce re-
source, as hides are only provided at a few places within the MMORPG
world at a limited rate of re-appearance.9 Through in-game use of
force, annoyance, or other in-game means they can try to drive the
other hunter away. Efficiency of hide hunting is maximized through
domination of the area where scarce hides can be obtained. The players
may try to drive away congestion of a common good before it even
occurs.10 Instead of using brute force within the game world, one of
6 A MMORPG released by Sony Online Entertainment in 1999.
7 EverQuest’s in-game currency.
8 http://stationexchange.station.sony.com, accessed 26.07.2008.
9 That term is also known as so-called respawn-rate, a common solution within MMORPGs
to temporarily limit the availability of certain resources and thus induce and simulate
scarcity. See Bartle, 2003, p.347 for further information.
10 If a deer is automatically provided by the game it is rivalrous, but not excludable and
thus a common good unless there are means for players to claim its ownership within
the game world.
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the players may also try the use of economic force, paying the other
player with in-game currency or commodities to leave the forest.
Second, they can try to find a solution through direct negotiation. An
agreement can be made that Player A hunts deer south of the river
within the forest while Player B moves to the forest north of the river.
However, as soon as a third player enters the forest to hunt down deer,
all of them will need to find a new agreement and re-coordinate their
activities.
Last, they may as well cooperate. Hunting together, their pace of killing
deer is increased, the hides and other commodities acquired during
that time are shared. With combined strength, they may now even be
able to delve deeper into to the forest and hunt down more dangerous
but also more profitable creatures, e.g. bears. For certain tasks, the use
of the cooperative method may even be required because a single player
is not able to achieve a goal by own means. Cooperation is usually
enhanced in MMORPGs. While accumulating MMORPG commodities
or even before entering the game world, due to limited advancement
opportunities, players specialize in certain skillsets to become spe-
cialized agents. (Castronova, 2001, p.11) Through computer-simulated
restrictions, they again give up a part of their personal freedom to be
granted new freedoms and certain skillsets. Through combination of
the skillsets, previously unbeatable tasks can now be completed. Some
of those cooperative tasks require the coordinated skillset combination
of a large group of players. That has even lead to the evolution of com-
pletely player-enforced and -regulated currencies called DKP, dragon
kill points, where players participating in certain cooperative tasks are
compensated for the provision of their specialized skillset. The DKP
can then be used during cooperative activities to buy cooperatively
achieved in-game commodities of very high quality. (Castronova and
Fairfield, 2007, p.4, 7f.)
The specialized skillsets can be combined real-time or subsequently.
This results in division of labor and emergence of both social and busi-
ness networks. For example a miner, a blacksmith, and a geologist may
work together to increase their individual productivity and share the
outcomes of their combined skillsets. The specialized skillsets and any-
thing else players acquire during MMORPG gameplay, are aggregated
into individual corporeal representations within the game world, the
avatars.
2.5 self-representation through the avatar
The avatar is the bundle of all tangible and intangible, environmental
and bodily attributes that a player acquires while playing an MMORPG.
(Castranova, 2003b, p.7f.) Tangible assets are anything one can visu-
ally demonstrate within an MMORPG world.11 Intangible values are
immaterial goods like social status, reputation, and knowledge about
the game’s mechanics or certain in-game locations. Other bodily and
environmental attributes further enhance the avatar: the chosen game
11 e.g. rideable mounts, armor, weapons, raw materials, currency, MMORPG real estate etc.
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world ruleset12, level13, class14, gender, or attractiveness15. (Castranova,
2003b, p.23f.) All social, reputational, and personal accumulations are
combined and aggregated into the avatar entity. (Castranova, 2003b, p.6)
That way, the avatar becomes the proxy for all of the player’s in-game
actions performed by that specific avatar. (Manninen and Kujanpää,
2007, p.25)
That condensation of player-acquired values causes a lock-in effect:
certain attributes and commodities are untransferable, especially to
worlds of other MMORPG competitors but also to other avatars within
the game. Migrating to a different online game world results in high
switching costs, as all avatar capital, social status and reputation and
all progress within and knowledge of the current MMORPG have to be
re-acquired in the migrated-to online game world. (Castranova, 2005b,
p.139f.) This lock-in effect is desirable for the game’s operators as it
reduces likeliness of a player switching to the MMORPG product of a
competitor. (Shapiro and Varian, 1999, p.152)
To compensate parts of their switching costs, players but also RMT
services often sell avatars or some of their accumulated virtual com-
modities for real money. Based on the prices, professor Castranova has
tried to determine Norrath’s16 average gross national product, GNP,
that is the total amount of wealth an EverQuest avatar generated within
a year. He concludes that as of 2001, an EverQuest player accumulated
a total wealth of $2,266 per capita per year, making Norrath the 77th
richest country in the world based on World Bank data. (Castronova,
2001, p.32)
That data is again questionable. As Castranova confirms, avatars are
usually offered at a discount price as certain customization options,
especially in terms of avatar appearance, are lost when a pre-made
character is sold. Also, the social status, reputation, and system-related
knowledge of an avatar cannot be included in the shadow price as
the person connected to that avatar changes. (Castronova, 2001, p.32)
Due to the shadow price, the calculations rely on external market data
to measure internal econometrics. Because of the different activities
performed in real life and within an MMORPG, the GNPs are rather
contextual than comparable. Plus, only those activities that avatar buy-
ers are willing to pay for are included into the measure. In addition,
Castranova used the number of average concurrent users for the GNP
determination whereas for real world measurement, total users are
factored in. (Lehtiniemi, 2008, p.32f.)
Independent of the significance of the data, however, it is certain that
avatars and all commodities acquired within a MMORPG do have a
real economic value as other MMORPG users decide via in-game and
game-external willingness-to-pay that the offered commodity is scarce
and thus of value to them. That the virtual commodities can only be
used within a game is irrelevant as far as economics is concerned.
12 Within some MMORPGs, players may choose to which degree they are attackable to
other players.
13 The level is a numeric indicator for the amount of an avatar’s in-game experience.
14 Classes are predetermined combinations of skillsets, e.g. warrior, wizard, cleric, necro-
mancer etc.
15 Which is obtained through both character customization before entering the game and
acquisition of in-game commodities like worn finely woven robes or rare armor.
16 The name of the game world in EverQuest.
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(Castranova, 2006, p.4) The value of an avatar but also of any other
single commodity is determined by several parameters which can be
maximized for optimal individual allocation of scarce MMORPG play
time. This leads to the avatar production function.
2.6 avatar production function
According to Castranova, 2005b, p.187f., the production function of
each avatar is:
q = f(L,H,A,K,R).
In prose: objects q are acquired by a player f through the combination of
his time L, his competence of play H, his avatar attributes A, his avatar’s
equipment K, and the number of obtainable17 resources R provided by
the game world.
A few factors from the previous sections, however, should also be
considered. One of them is game knowledge. If a player finds out about
certain game rule mechanics, e.g. how to maximize a certain avatar
attribute for a certain skillset very quickly, he acquires an advantage
compared to other players with the same skillset. For example, a player
who inhabits the in-game societal role of a cook discovers that adding
wine to his food increases the quality of his meals. None of the above
mentioned factors are enhanced by this discovery.
Wealth in MMORPGs also means the accumulation of social status and
reputation. (Bartle, 2004, p.13) A player can develop and enhance his
social standing towards other players through actions that can not be
determined by his equipment, his avatar’s attributes, or his competence
of play. For example, a player may be known as a charismatic player of
great personality or as a tactically skilled commander, or other skills not
or at most rudimentarily technically represented by available measur-
able numeric avatar skillsets. This system-internal social network can
be included within the factor H of an avatar, as it increases availability
of additional system-related knowledge and information. A measurable
numeric value for that social network is hard to determine, though. In
addition, the social network is bound to the according person behind
the avatar and thus intransferable.
Users not only log in to a MMORPG for pure means of maximum avatar
productivity. Playing MMORPGs is also a recreational activity where
personal enjoyment is of importance. (Kaminski, 2006, p.4) Still, there
are vast realistic economies within MMORPGs. In-game, players trade
obtained commodities and raw materials with each other, specialize in
trade skills and other professions, and sell their products to other users.
The game economies are an essential part of each MMORPG world.
As they are of economic significance, they are also susceptible to the
same influences as real life economies. (Castranova, 2007, p.2) Those
influences that regularly occur within MMORPGs have lead to severe
in-game price instability which will be discussed in the next chapter.
17 The amount of obtainable resources may be restricted by skillsets available to the avatar,
player congestion of a resource node, skillset limitations etc.
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P R I C E I N S TA B I L I T Y I N M M O R P G S
In this chapter, price instability within MMORPGs will be illustrated
and analyzed. First, MUDflation, the phenomenon MMORPG in-game
markets usually suffer from, will be explained and presented with
available data 3.1. Second, the two aspects of MUDflation will be
analyzed: excess demand in rare luxury and high-end goods 3.2 and
excess supply in money 3.3. The later derives from discrepancy of
inputs and outputs 3.3.1, non-profit intra- and inter-user transactions
3.3.2, and Real Money Trade 3.3.3. Following, the effects of MUDflation
are demonstrated. Within the online game worlds, MUDflation leads to
devaluation of in-game commodities and thus the value of time and
effort invested into the game 3.4. This affects the game-external interests
of the MMORPG operators and their competiveness on the MMORPG
market accordingly 3.5. Subscription revenues are decreased 3.5.1 and
service provision costs increased 3.5.2, which threatens profitability and
competitiveness on the MMORPG market.
3.1 the mudflation phenomenon
MUDflation1 is generally refered to as the devaluation of common low-
to medium-quality in-game commodities combined with the simultane-
ous increase of prices for rare high-end and luxury goods. (Dibbell, 2006,
p.89) The general price level within the MMORPG economy decreases
even though more and more money enters the game’s economy, which
would normally result in inflation and a price level increase. (Castra-
nova, 2005b, p.196f.) Instead, MMORPG players prioritize consumption
of the scarcest goods within the online game worlds.
According to Castranova, Lehtiniemi, and Heeks, the rate of commodity
devaluation within MMORPGs is significant. In 2001, the Everquest
world suffered from a 29% deflation within one year due to the price
collaps from items. To determine the decline in prices, Castranova chose
a non-weighed basket of 29 medium quality commodities. The results
are questionable as the actual standard bundle of items remaines un-
determined, Castronova, 2001, p.34, and the actual cost-of-living is not
factored in. (Lehtiniemi, 2008, p.34) Also, the data used by Castranova
was provided by some, not all, players of the EverQuest game world
to a game fanpage internet database. Therefore, data errors are very
likely. Lehtiniemi’s results, however, support the general tendency to-
wards high deflation within MMORPGs. Lehtiniemi was provided with
logged and thus highly accurate economic data by the operators of the
sci-fi MMORPG EVE Online. He then used official UN econometrics to
determine EVE’s inflation rate. Within 2006, prices deflated by 12%. For
the first six months of 2007, the deflation of virtual commodities sold on
EVE’s market went up to 8-10% per month, or 48-60% within 6 months.
1 The term origins from the combination of the two words MUD, abbrev. for "‘multi-user
dungeon"’, the text-only predecessor of MMORPGs, and inflation.
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(Lehtiniemi, 2008, p.63) Heeks compared in-game currency to dollar
exchange rates from 2005 and 2008, using inofficial grey market prices
for currencies of MMORPG titles with the currently largest subscriber
bases. Within that timeframe, in-game money devalued against the
dollar by roughly 75%. (Heeks, 2008, p.22) While more accurate and
long-term data is required to varify and further validate MMORPG
tendency towards high deflation, its existence is undeniable.
Deflation is a decrease in the general price level. It leads to reduced
consumption and investment as consumers and producers delay pur-
chases until prices fall even further. It usually occurs when the supply
of money decreases. Within MMORPGs, however, the supply of money
rather rises, which should theoretically result in inflation and increased
consumption. Within online roleplaying games, both is the case: there is
generally a high willingness-to-pay for rare top quality items whereas
there is little to no demand for common low- to mid-quality products.
Following, both excess supply in money and excess demand in rare
high-end and luxury items will be analyzed and discussed in detail.
3.2 excess demand in rare luxury and high-end goods
Within MMORPGs, there is usually a great demand for rare high qual-
ity goods while players struggle in selling common low- to mid-end
quality goods on the player-to-player trade market. Castranova argues
that this is due to the ongoing gradual increase in avatar gear. (Castra-
nova, 2005b, p.197) The increase of avatar attributes within MMORPGs
usually unlocks access to items of greater quality. For example, as a
result of practising in sword combat, an avatar’s attribute for fencing
rises above a certain value so that he can now not only use swords, but
also broadswords. To show off his increased status, the player switches
to the now accessible unlocked weapon type and gets rid of his old
intermediate sword by selling it to an NPC or to another player. As
available attributes are usually limited, e.g. by a maximum obtainable
avatar level, the amount of acquirable improvements diminishes over
time invested into the game. As a result, the amount of intermediate
items within the game economy rises as they are provided by both
advancing players and by the game world. Simultaneously, the compe-
tition for rare and high-end commodities intensifies and thus the prices
for these items increase.
This results in an according distribution and high availability of inter-
mediate commodities within MMORPG markets. In order to reduce
supply of intermediate items, different strategies could be performed to
reduce their availability and increase their meaningfulness and impor-
tance. In addition, players need not, like within the real world, invest a
substantial amount of their in-game income on necessary expenditures
like food, shelter, or health care. The cost of living and the urgence
to meet basic needs is rather rudimentary within MMORPGs, e.g. in-
game armor and weapon repair costs. This accordingly affects player
consumption. In order to further increase price stability within online
game worlds, in addition to the MUDflation problem both issues would
need to be adressed by the game developers. A thorough discussion of
these two issues would, however, go beyond the scope of this thesis.
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For the individual player, demand in very scarce items is a reason-
able strategy in terms of the avatar production function: while low-
to mid-quality items only increase the avatar gear to a lesser extent,
investing in highest quality commodities maximizes several factors.
Avatar gear is boosted for the greatest available extent. Consequently,
the outcome of time invested, game-internal reputation, and overall
earnings are increased in the most efficient way. As competition for
high-end commodities gets more and more intense, it is likely that the
acquired commodity will increase in value whereas low- to mid-end
quality items will probably rather decline. It is in a player’s best inter-
est to maximize his current gear status as soon as possible. That way,
high prices for high-end goods are repeatedly approved by the player
community. Through high overall equipment quality, the time and the
effort it takes to acquire commodities is reduced.
Robinett argues that the players’ willingness to prefer spending in-
game money over spending in-game time on increasing avatar capital
suggests that a lot of players rather judge the process of reaching
the maximum available skillset as a necessary evil than an enjoyable
experience. (Robinett, 2006)
3.3 excess supply in money
Independent of the motivations for demand in high-quality goods, there
apparently is an excess supply in game money as players are wealthy
enough to invest in rare high-end commodities, even when their current
avatar status in terms of available time, gear, and avatar skills is rather
low. Wealth, of course, is a relative measure: in developed countries,
a person is wealthy when he has significantly more income than the
majority of the people. In a developing country, a person is wealthy
when he has a regular income. Interestingly, in 2001 the poverty rate in
EverQuest’s Norrath was 33% based on median wealth and 68% based
on mean wealth. (Castronova, 2001, p.36) While a substantial part of the
players can apparently afford the best purchasable commodities within
the game, there also seems to be a large amount of players that have
no means whatsoever to catch up to the relatively wealthier MMORPG
citizens. The range of goods and commodities the less wealthy players
can produce and acquire does not surpass the in-game profitable quality
level that would allow them to catch up. Prices for rare high-quality
items are consequently unaffordable for them.
How come this large amount of money is available to certain players
will be explained in the following subsections. Three different sources
of excess supply in money within MMORPGs can be identified:
• excess supply acquired solely through avatar means,
• excess supply acquired and subsidized through in-game support-
ers, and
• excess supply acquired and subsidized through game-external
means.
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3.3.1 Discrepancy of Inputs and Outputs
In MMORPGs, wealth generally enters the economy faster than it
leaves it. (Bartle, 2003, p.300f.) Burke argues that this is because raw
materials, commodities, and other marketable items are so rapidly
renewed within the game world that they are nearly infinite in supply.
In addition, he states that only few commodities are taken out of market
circulation, piling up the supply of goods even more. He also suggests
that exploiters and powergamers, groups of players that seek the most
efficient and fastest acquisition of commodities for the least or even
no risk, outnumber the, as he calls them, moral economists. (Burke,
2002, p.5,8,9-13) Dibbell mentions that MMORPGs lack consequence
and economic risk. (Dibbell, 2003), (Dibbell, 2006, p.103) If something
goes wrong, players may just loose some of their time to recover but
not loose their previous acquisitions.
A person solely driven by economic rationale would usually stop ac-
quiring commodities if sale prices and thus his wage were too low.
The avatar production function however, as explained in the previous
chapter, does not only consist of the acquisition of better equipment
and wealth. Activities that generate albeit inefficiently monetizable
commodities often also increase other avatar-driving factors like avatar
attributes, game knowledge, social networking, or non avatar-related
enjoyment for the player behind the avatar. (Dibbell, 2006, p.89) Es-
pecially the gradual increase of avatar attributes, the accumulation of
avatar power alongside the accumulation of in-game financial power,
is a common objective in role-playing games. A blacksmith may not
only craft armor and weapons to make a living from it, but also to
increase his blacksmithing skill to be able to produce commodities of
even greater quality and value. To become a master swordsmith, a
smith may first need to produce many common swords of lower and
medium quality to raise his blacksmithing skill above a certain skillset
value. Only after surpassing that value, he may forge swords of the
finest and highest available quality. This can similarily apply to the
acquisition of raw materials: to learn mining of silver and gold veins, a
miner may first need to advance to that proficiency level by mining a
lot of intermediate copper, bronze, and iron.
In addition to increasing avatar attributes, a steady increase in wealth
can indicate to a player that he is performing well. Dependent on
the gameplay features, he can determine if his business within the
MMORPG is running smoothely or if he makes use of his chosen
skillset in an efficient way. In terms of economics, this form of gener-
ating surplus income is completely fine as it rewards efficient use and
allocation of available resources through good individual performance.
As long as the outcome of one’s personal work within an online role-
playing game solely derives from investment of time and personal labor
of that specific avatar, there is no need of regulation or interference
through the game operators.
3.3.2 Unbalanced Intra-Economy Transactions
Besides wealth solely acquired through own avatar means, however, a
player’s avatar may also receive monetary support and subsidies from
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other avatars. It can be distinguished between inter-player transactions
and intra-player transactions.
As demonstrated in section 2.6, players support each other through
their social network within the game. If a player acquires a commodity
he cannot or does not want to use, he may as well donate it to a player
of his social network to reinforce his social status. That way players
enhance each other based on mutual social connections. (Burke, 2002,
p.7) Tangible and monetizable gear is exchanged for intangible and non-
monetizable social status. While this kind of inter-player transaction
may but does not need to be balanced through social connections, it is
hard to acknowledge and validate it technically as player-based motiva-
tions for donations cannot be acquired and tracked. Solely technically
speaking, when a player donates an in-game commodity to another
player, the receiving player gets something in return for technically
nothing.
Intra-player transactions, on the other hand, can rather be classified
as the redistribution of a player’s general wealth between his in-game
personifications, his avatars. Players are often allowed to have multiple
avatars within an online roleplaying game. A player may, for exam-
ple, want to use another avatar for storage purposes. These so-called
"‘mules"’ are sent items that the so-called "‘main character"’ of a player
does not need on a daily basis to clear up or organize limited storage
room. (Burke, 2002, p.8) A player may also want to swap to another
predetermined skillset when he wishes to try out another skillset or in-
game role and previously obtained avatar attributes are intransferable.
He can then support his new avatar with the wealth acquired by his
previous avatars.
But MMORPGs are usually designed in a way that the outcome of
invested time gradually increases through avatar progression. For ex-
ample, an expert alchemist can produce potions worth of at least 50
in-game gold pieces per hour while an apprentice alchemist may at
most earn five gold pieces per hour. If a new avatar is supported by
a further developed avatar, he is subsidized with sufficient funds to
acquire commodities within the MMORPG economy that he could not
afford by own means and he can progress through the ranks faster than
an unsupported player. (Burke, 2002, p.7)
The above described intra-economy transactions allow the, in compar-
ison to non-subsidized avatars, very easy acquisition of items, com-
modities, and even skillsets without being backed up by time and effort
invested into the game by the receiving avatar for a gradual individual
progression. Subsidized avatars acquire resources, avatar skillsets, and
wealth based on others’, not their own avatar production function. If
these transactions are allowed by the game, subsidies Z would have to
be added to the avatar production function, with the according exter-
nalities caused by them, that is welfare losses. Through these unilateral
unbalanced transactions, certain economic principles which will be
discussed in chapter 5 are violated and thus have to be regulated. The
last source of excess supply in money, real money trade, RMT, will be
illustrated in the following subsection.
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3.3.3 Real Money Trade
RMT is the "‘direct consequence of the scarcity of the users’ time"’.
(Lehtiniemi, 2008, p.19) It is a process where players who lack the time,
ability, or patience for MMORPGs invest real life surplus to acquire
virtual surplus. (Dibbell, 2006, p.12) This has lead to the emergence
of services where companies employ people with a low opportunity
cost on time to perform certain tasks within MMORPGs. (Lehtiniemi,
2008, p.24) These employees are generally refered to as "‘Chinese gold
farmers"’. They work in 12-18 hour shifts in-game, continuously acquir-
ing resources, in-game money, and commodities provided by the game
world, and then sell the obtained system-internal valuables via resellers
to MMORPG players for real money.2
The range of provided RMT services is very broad. All tangible in-game
goods are traded: weapons, armor, real estate, and other commodities,
MMORPG currency, accounts, and avatars. (Bartle, 2004, p.3) Many
other services are provided. Players who want to change the game
server3 or switch to another MMORPG can have their previous in-
game wealth transferred to the new server or game. (Dibbell, 2006,
p.173) Platforms have been implemented where players can, outside
the game, exchange in-game commodities between each other for a
fee. There are platforms where players interested in RMT services can
compare the prices of the different RMT sellers; and platforms where
players can compare prices of in-game commodities across game servers.
(Castranova, 2005b, p.164) Within year one of the officially tolerated
RMT platform Sony Station Exchange, 58% of expenditures were spent
for acquiring in-game money, 38% to have one’s own avatar skillset
increased by others, and 3% for in-game item sales. (Robischon, 2007,
p.5)
Ebay’s market volume of virtual item trade between April 1st to April
14th 2004 was $156,857. (Bartle, 2004, p.2) In 2006, the RMT market
leader IGE estimated the overall RMT market to be worth about $900
million and projected a growth to $7 billion in 2009. (Kaminski, 2006,
p.2) The Chinese government claimed in 2006 that in China alone the
RMT market volume was $901 million. (PlayNoEvil, 2007) Heeks states
that the current gold farming market volume exceeds at least $500
mio. per annum. (Heeks, 2008, p.9f.) As of 2006, the World of Warcraft4
currency traded at a rate comparable to the Russian ruble, the Lineage
II5 exchange rate was on par with the Turkish lira. (Dibbell, 2006, p.12f.)
EverQuest II introduced StationExchange, an official RMT service for two
of its game servers in 2005. According to official data provided, 1,500
of 9,042 registered players used that service, generating a transaction
volume of $2,588 per day. (Robischon, 2007, p.3f.) Independent of the
actual market volume, it is safe to say that the size of the RMT market
is significant. If there is a significant market volume and a demand for
the provided services, a supply side will arise and meet that demand
to generate real-life profit.
2 For more information on the term and on the life of a "‘Chinese gold farmer"’ see Dibbell,
2007.
3 Dependant on the game’s success, multiple copies of the game world are provided by
the MMORPG’s operators. Players are generally allowed to have multiple characters on
any of the game’s servers.
4 Released by Blizzard Entertainment in 2004.
5 A MMORPG by NCSoft, released in 2003.
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Motivations for that demand are various. Robischon states that most
players used SonyStationExchange to fulfill an immediate desire, increase
their in-game status, short-cut to content for in terms of avatar skills
highly progressed avatars, or to stay aligned with friends who had
more time spare. (Robischon, 2007, pp.18-20) Bartle states that players
also buy and sell virtual goods to make profit and to get things they
could usually not get due to the resource domination of gold farmers.
(Bartle, 2004, p.17) Based on Yee’s player motivations (Yee, 2006, p.774)
Lehdonvirta analyzed player perceptions of RMT. He adds that RMT
buyers also want to examine different avatar skillset configurations,
gain a competitive advantage compared to other players, and assign
tasks they do not personally like to perform within the online game
worlds to other labor forces. (Lehdonvirta, 2005a, p.6)
While some of those motivations may seem individually reasonable,
RMT greatly enhances the excess supply in money and MUDflation in
general as game-external interests with a substantial monetary volume
enter the MMORPG in-game markets. Due to its large volume, RMT
can be declared as a main driver of MUDflation. Its effects on both the
game-internal economy and on the operation of MMORPG services
will be described in the following sections.
As described above, through the occurrence of gold farming and real
money trade, a new industry has emerged. This industry currently em-
ploys several hundred thousand workers. Most of them work in China
where the opportunity cost of time and workforce is low compared
to wages in industrialized nations. (Heeks, 2008, p.14f.) One might
argue that due to that new industry and the hundreds of thousands of
new jobs, gold farming and RMT are beneficial to the global economy.
Welfare analysts may argue that RMT leads to a welfare increase as
producers and consumers generate surplus by trading available time
for available real life surplus income. RMT however also generates
significant social costs within the game and for the game operators that
have to be taken into account to determine its overall effect. (Castranova,
2006, pp.6-8)
Profiteers of gold farming and RMT enterprises understandably support
the existence of these markets. On the other hand, both regular players,
that is players who do not participate in RMT and gold farming on
the producer or customer side, and MMORPG operators argue that
MUDflation and its main driver RMT lead to an overall distortion of the
in-game economy 3.4. MMORPG operators claim RMT causes increased
costs of service provision 3.5.1 and revenue losses 3.5.2.
3.4 in-game effects on status and wealth
In-game wealth, as explained in chapter 2, is accumulated by the steady
increase of the factors that constitute the avatar production function
q = f(L,H,A,K,R). A player can accumulate more than he spends
through efficient use of his play proficiency and game knowledge.
Those two values cannot be acquired through other than an avatar’s
own means. Thus, this form of acquired wealth is backed up by per-
sonal commitment and skills. The free transfer of valuable in-game
commodities to members of a player’s social network increases the
social status of the sender and the gear of the recipient. Non-profit
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intra-economy transactions between player avatars are backed up by
previous mutual interactions. As the time of acquisition and the time
of reception do not overlap, however, the commodity may socially but
not technically be allocated to that inter-player connection. While this
behavior is certainly kind and strengthens social bonds, it also violates
certain economic principles which will be demonstrated in chapter 5.
RMT, especially due to its large monetary volume, greatly deteriorates
the value of all elements that are factored in the avatar production
function. Gold farmers continuously harvest resources and commodities
within and provided by the MMORPG worlds. They regularly occupy
the most efficient resource spots within game worlds to gain wealth
and items in such a way that they are able to claim those areas as theirs.
(Blizzard, 2008), (Castranova, 2006, pp.17-19), (Jagex, 2008), (Kaminski,
2006, p.5) That reduces space and opportunities for in-game economic
gameplay for regular players. (Millard, 2006) As resource nodes are
occupied by the gold farmers, the stock of in-game materials and items
obtainable through personal commitment and investment of scarce
available play time remain constantly low. To acquire materials, regular
players are driven to buy them from the RMT sellers with either in-
game or game-external means, the later being real money. Through
that in-game behavior of resource domination, gold farming enterprises
generate their own in-game and out-game customers. As the game
world resources required to increase avatar attributes are harder to
obtain, it also becomes harder for players to advance their skillsets and
thus to increase their in-game profitability and acquisition of wealth
and status. (Castranova, 2006, pp.17-19)
As the gold farmers sell their obtained commodities on the in-game
market, more and more money and items are pumped into the in-game
economy. Regular players cannot compete with the non-stop working
profit-driven farmers and are thus pushed out of the market through
further deflation of common comodities and inflation of avatar upgrade
costs. (ArenaNet, 2008), (Bartle, 2004, p.18), (Blizzard, 2008) This deval-
ues previously obtained avatar gear, game knowledge and proficiency
of play as players cannot make optimal use of their individual skillsets
against gold farmers they cannot compete with. As prices for common
goods steadily decrease, the players’ returns of invested scarce playtime
and thus the value of effort put into earning in-game things are dimin-
ished. More time is required to gather money for personal in-game
needs. (Drescher, 2008), (Castranova, 2007, p.11) Consequently, time
and effort invested into the game is less rewarding, overall earnings and
the value of the player’s in-game representation, the avatar, decrease.
In addition, the gold farmers make use of in-game communication
tools like the public chat to advertise their services. (ArenaNet, 2008),
(Blizzard, 2008), (Castranova, 2006, pp.17-19) That way, the players’
experience of communicating with other players, especially at densely
populated trading spots, is reduced. It is harder for regular player
craftsmen to market their in-game wares as the communication chan-
nels for trading are spammed by RMT service advertisers. Hence, the
opportunities for players to raise their social status, exchange game
knowledge, and make an in-game living are deteriorated. That way, it
is harder for system-internal interest groups to strengthen and retain
community bonds.
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As it is easier for RMT customers to obtain in-game commodities,
play proficiency and game knowledge are devalued. The avatar gear
is no longer associated with a player’s in-game ability to play but
rather with a player’s out-game ability to pay. This is also refered to as
cheating. (Lehdonvirta, 2005a, p.2), (Millard, 2006) To stay competitive
with RMT customers, regular players have to either participate in gold
farming activities, increasing congestion of resource nodes even more,
or use RMT themselves. Through occupation of resource nodes and
communication channels, RMT generates its own customers. This leads
to frustration of regular players who may thus come to the conclusion
that their time invested into the online game is not valuable enough any
longer and quit the game. (Castranova, 2007, pp.11-13), (Jagex, 2008)
Heeks argues that the players who suffer from RMT and the players
that oppose it do not overlap and that players themselves farm gold.
(Heeks, 2008, p.19) As explained above, however, the social costs of
RMT are solely born by the users who do not, do not want to, or cannot
participate in gold farming activities. Second, regular players are driven
to participate in RMT activities by the existance of RMT. RMT buyers
and sellers get an increase in utility while the regular players’ utility is
decreased. (Castranova, 2006, p.7)
To summarize the above: RMT degenerates MMORPG in-game markets
and their economic integrity, devalues the effort and time players invest
into the online game world, and thus drives players out of the game.
The value and outcome of the players’ time invested is diminished as
the overall social costs and negative effects on in-game trading greatly
outnumber the individual benefits for RMT users. The overall quality
of the MMORPG system is reduced which increases the required effort
and thus investments for MMORPG operators to retain and increase
the quality of their service.
3.5 game-external effects on market competitiveness
MMORPGs are system software services run by private companies6.
The service of operating online roleplaying games underlies the prof-
itability constraint. Revenues are generated through the regular return
of the customers to the service. For most MMORPGs, the payment of
a subscription fee is required in order to be able to log into the game.
In the recent past, other payment methods have been brought up, e.g.
content update fees, in-game advertisements, or microtransactions. All
payment methods, however, rely upon a substantial, steady, and healthy
user base that continuously and regularly returns to the online game
world.
This results in competition for subscribers by the game operators on
the MMORPG market. In order to attract customers to their service and
retain their current customer base, the developers have to continuously
invest in the quality of their product. They have to maintain, update,
and create additional game content to satisfy and entertain both their
current and potential subscribers. It is in the developers’ best interest
to keep their players continuously busy and satisfied with the game.
(Castronova, 2002, p.25f.) The lower they can keep the churn rate, the
6 In case of MMORPGs, that is usually the publisher or developer of the game.
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rate at which people leave a virtual in-game community, the stronger the
bonds within the player community become and the less likely players
will switch to another MMORPG product. (Bartle, 2003, p.224)
The maintenance costs of MMORPGs are significant. MMORPG opera-
tors have to provide game servers, according server bandwidth, and
employ according technical staff for server maintenance. Additional
workforce for billing, customer service, and in-game issues has to be
provided. A development team for the live service has to be maintained
that continuously updates and overhaules existing game mechanics
and game content and fixes software bugs. A second team is usually
employed that develops additional large content updates. (Castranova,
2006, p.9f.)
Like with any other provision of a service, the operation revenues from
subscriptions, microtransactions, or advertisements have to exceed the
operation costs to remain profitable and competitive on the MMORPG
market. The lower a MMORPG operator can keep his operation costs,
the more likely he will remain in the market and the more money he
can invest in increasing the quality of the provided service to attract
additional and retain current customers. MMORPG operators that
cannot remain profitable and competitive will consequently have to
shut down their MMORPG service. The MMORPG that can provide
the highest service quality and that can keep its operation costs low,
will acquire a competitive advantage on the MMORPG market.
RMT increases MMORPG operation costs 3.5.1 because the game oper-
ators have to invest in combatting its negative effects. It also decreases
subscription revenues 3.5.2 as customers frustrated by its existance
leave the game by cancelling their subscriptions.
3.5.1 Increased MMORPG Operation Costs
As explained in section 3.4, RMT degenerates the quality of MMORPG
systems, which damages the provided service’s quality. (Castranova,
2006, p.13) To reduce the according negative effects for MMORPG
economies, the game operators have to take actions to combat them. As
it is hard to differentiate between a gold farmer and a farming player
who tries to stay competitive to RMT customers, each case has to be
examined individually by according personnel. Complaints have to be
investigated and according action has to be taken. This takes away time
from processing other game-related issues and from the development
and update of game content, which endangers the satisfaction of the
customers.
RMT sellers not only use cheap labor but also technological exploits
like in-game software code bugs, trojan viruses and keyloggers. This
further increases the required activities MMORPG operators have to
perform to fight the negative effects of real money trade. MMORPG
operators have to develop tools to fight and counter the use of game
exploits and automated bots. Account fraud is also becoming a major
issue where the online world operators have to help regular players to
recover their lost avatars and items. (ArenaNet, 2008), (Blizzard, 2008),
(Castranova, 2007, pp.14-16), (Jagex, 2008) In the recent past, several
trojans were developed that steal MMORPG account login data and
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send that data to RMT companies who then rip off all belongings of
the account’s avatars to then sell them on the in-game player-to-player
or game-external RMT market.7
The workforce dedicated to fighting RMT is significant. For Dark Age
of Camelot8, 20% of the customer service personnel were assigned to
that task. (Drescher, 2008) Jagex, developer of browser-based MMORPG
RuneScape, describes the technological competition with RMT sellers,
exploiters, and bots as an "‘arms race"’. From 2006 to mid 2007, Jagex
has seen a 250% growth in RMT sales. During that time, RMT accounts
worth of 725 billion in-game currency units were banned, a real world
value of over $4 million. For 2010, Jagex expects a banned amount of
8 trillion in-game money, that is $40 million. (Jagex, 2008) In April
2006, Blizzard, developer of World of Warcraft, banned 5,400 accounts
and suspended 10,700 and another 30,000 accounts worth of 30 mio. in-
game currency units in May 2006. (Blizzard, 2006a), (Blizzard, 2006b) In
an interview, World of Warcraft game director Jeffrey Kaplan stated that
Blizzard has an "‘entire team dedicated to combatting people who cheat"’
without revealing more specific info to keep according information
undisclosed to RMT sellers. (Worldofwar.net, 2008)
This leads to a dilemma: the MMORPG operators need to keep their cus-
tomers satisfied, which is costly. Fighting RMT and MUDflation further
increases costs. To sustain or increase profitability of MMORPG service
provision and thus overall competiveness, however, it is in the online
game operators best interest to keep direct workforce-intensive control
of the provided running service low. To avoid some common problems
ex ante, players are expected to accept and abide to general gameplay-
related rules imposed by the End User License Agreement, EULA, and
Terms of Service, ToS. The world operators only intervene in-game if
really necessary, with the result that within MMORPG environments
many player-to-player issues are rather spontaneously regulated by
the players.9 (Burke, 2002, p.33), (Castranova, 2005b, p.208f.) If the
world operators intervene, they usually do so with an act of oppressive
tyranny to make an example of their omnipotent power.10 (Castranova,
2005b, p.206-208)
RMT and MUDflation increase the amount of required oppressive
acts, as they have to be looked into case-wise to avoid frustration of
non-cheating players. They take away time and thus money from the
MMORPG developers that could be used more constructively for the
provision of the MMORPG service, for example the update of existing
game features, the creation of new content to increase user satisfaction,
or the reduction of customer service response time for other game-
related issues.
7 e.g. http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=
2005-073115-1710-99, Accessed 19.09.08.
8 A medieval fantasy MMORPG released by Mythic Entertainment in 2001.
9 E.g. if a player is harassed by another player, a common solution within MMORPGs
is to call in reinforcements of allied players and use force of arms instead of calling in
customer service personnel.
10 E.g. a player is banned for several days or even permanently.
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3.5.2 Loss in MMORPG Subscription Revenues
As dedicating a substantial part of the workforce to fighting RMT and
MUDflation costs money, the service operation revenues for online
game developers are decreased. The revenues are further reduced by
players that are frustrated by the negative effects of RMT on their
in-game achievements and status.
For users, the subscription model presents a marginal choice environ-
ment: each user decides on a monthly basis if he wants to continue
his subscription. (Castranova, 2006, p.10) As described in Chapter 2,
however, the longer a player keeps his subscription running, the larger
the avatar lock-in effect and switching costs grow as the personal evalu-
ation of acquired commodities, MMORPG system-related knowledge,
and community bonds gradually increase over time. Consequently, the
less likely a player will want to switch to another MMORPG service to
retain the previously acquired avatar value or to increase it even further.
(Castranova, 2003b, p.6), (Castranova, 2005b, p.139) The devaluation
of in-game wealth through MUDflation, as described in section 3.4,
gradually reduces avatar value, the value of the time invested into
the game and consequently the willingness-to-pay for the MMORPG
service. (Castranova, 2006, p.19)
Both the lock-in effect and the devaluation effect gradually rise. As
explained in 3.4, the devaluation effect diminishes all factors of the
avatar production function. The lock-in effect, however, only affects
the intangible elements of the avatar production function: the player’s
in-game social network as social connections with other players grow
more and more intense and game knowledge with increasing time
spent within the online game world, and to a lesser extent emotional
connections to the avatar belongings acquired through investment of
scarce playtime. If a player leaves the game because of devaluation
of his system-bound investments, all his previously acquired in-game
belongings are lost or at least frozen and thus taken out of the in-game
economy. Also, the social bonds of his in-game social network are
compromised, as social connections within the game are left behind.
It is thus safe to say that the system-based avatar lock-in effect can at
most partly absorb the external costs of the devaluation effect.
Therefore, Castranova’s assumption that RMT leads to an increase in
supply costs and a decrease in the demand for MMORPG services
should be accurate. (Castranova, 2006, p.24) Castranova made a precau-
tious calculation on the external costs of RMT based on that assump-
tion. Presuming low elasticities of loss in subscriptions and increased
MMORPG service provision costs, he came to the result that under
careful calculation, RMT causes annual costs of $1.8 million per 100,000
users. (Castranova, 2006, p.29f) As RMT has grown rapidly within
the last few years, it is safe to assume that, at a current subscriber
base of 15-20 million MMORPG users, Woodcock, 2008, chart 4, the
overall damages caused by RMT for the MMORPG operators and the
MMORPG player-base add up to at least, but likely significantly more,
300 hundred million dollars per annum.
The simultaneous increase in service provision costs and decrease in
demand for MMORPGs caused by MUDflation and RMT threaten the
profitability of MMORPG operation. As Andrew Gower, RuneScape’s
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lead developer, stated: "‘There has been a significant increase in the
amount of real-world trading this year. If we don’t find a solution to
RMT now, it will ruin RuneScape."’ (Jagex, 2008) If the online world
provider is not profitable any longer because the operation costs exceed
the operation revenues, the online game has to be shut down. In that
case, everything within the game world, all system-bound valuables and
investments, community bonds, and individual system-bound reputa-
tion and status are irrevocably lost. The MMORPG and its overarching
internal social and economic system collapse. Any investment and ef-
fort ever put into the MMORPG becomes useless, and any opportunity
for RMT companies to generate real world profits from MMORPGs at
all is annihilated. Gold farming gnaws at its own paw.
To prevent the threat of extinction through RMT and MUDflation for
online game worlds, a viable and working solution has to be found that
keeps system-external real money trade interests out of the game and
that stabilizes MMORPG in-game markets. Castranova suggests that,
due to their omnipotent power that allows them to change and adjust
any in-game commodity at virtually no cost, price control may be a
good policy for the online world operators to counter in-game price
instability. (Castronova, 2002, p.4)

4
T H E O RY O F P R I C E C O N T R O L I N M M O R P G S
Price control has been performed both within the real world and within
the virtual worlds of online roleplaying games. After discussing cir-
cumstances and goals of price control applied in the real world, 4.1,
price control strategies performed within MMORPGs will be illustrated,
4.2. Within online game worlds, central planning 4.2.1, faucet / drain
system 4.2.2, and customer service representative, CSR, prosecution
4.2.3, have been established. Their known outcomes within the game
worlds are demonstrated in the corresponding subsections.
4.1 real world price control
According to Butterworth, price control is a "‘policy used by governing
authorities to restrict prices"’. He argues that it was used to deal with
crises, monopolistic practices, and inflation. (Butterworth, 1994, p.1,3)
The Romans used it to fight inflation. It was used in medieval times to
enforce reasonable profits for guild members. During World War I and
II, and in the Soviet Union, it was used to control the major elements of
the cost of living index. (Butterworth, 1994, pp.4-20)
The overall purposes why price control was applied that are mentioned
by Butterworth are questionable, though. The Romans were in a con-
stant state of war, expanding and occupying territory through oppres-
sive force. The overarching institutional and governmental system was
organized in a way that matched that general focus on conquest, con-
trol, and expansion of power. Occupied territories were administrated,
resources available within them were subordinated to the general goals
of the Roman Empire. Free market prices and conditions at least within
markets critical to the war and expansion efforts would have been
harder to subdue to the overarching Roman Empire’s interests. This
similarily applies to the Soviet Union as well as governing authorities
in general that are or were highly involved in military conflicts, e.g. a
World War or a civil war; or authorities that, in terms of power, are or
were reliant on the oppression of the civilian population. It is safe to
assume that within the real world, price control was and is primarily
used to exercise authoritarian control on the according markets and to
subordinate them to the goals of the controlling authorities.
Thus, Butterworth’s proposition that the popularity of price control
greatly depends on the attitude of the people towards it is also ques-
tionable. He states that if it is seen necessary and effective and if it is
appropriate for the current circumstances and objectives, price control
is generally accepted by the people. (Butterworth, 1994, p.187)
Within the real world, consumers have or had no or very limited means
to avoid price control policies. Emerging black market prices generally
exceed prices set by the controlling agency. Emigration to other systems
is either impossible because emigrants are declared enemies by either
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the migrated-to or the migrated-from country or because emigrants
have to face substantial costs of relocation.
On the producer side, price control has so far proven hard to maintain
within the real world. Fixed prices reduce incentives for the produc-
ers to efficiently allocate resources. As the prices for goods are set
by the government and not their manufacturers, the producers often
circumvented price control by reducing product quality or by justifying
price increases through cosmetic product changes.1 (Butterworth, 1994,
p.47)
4.2 mmorpg worlds price control
The problems caused by price control within the real world that were
described in the previous section are greatly reduced within MMORPG
worlds. In-game producers cannot alter the quality of their products
or apply cosmetic product changes. Resources and activities required
for the production of a commodity are usually hard-coded as the
game world is computer-simulated, 2.1. In addition, consumers within
MMORPG internal markets are also consumers of a service provided
within the real world. If they are not satisfied with the in-game market
and price conditions, they may freely make use of an exit option by
discontinuing their subscription. They still face switching costs or sunk
costs through abandoning their avatars and in-game accomplishments.
They do not, however, face threats of oppressive controlling authorities
to their real life existance if they deny their approval to policies applied
by the authorities.
Still, as shown in chapter 3, the necessity of a strategy to fight MUD-
flation and the occurrence of RMT and to stabilize in-game markets is
undeniable. Whichever strategy is carried out by the game operators,
it is crucial that players do not get frustrated by it as only returning
customers provide a steady income stream for the MMORPG opera-
tors. Second, it should not pose a high administrative burden on the
developers to keep their operation costs low.
Several strategies of price control were and are still executed by MMORPG
operators. The following approaches to in-game price control have been
tried in the past by MMORPG developers: central planning 4.2.1, faucet
/ drain economy 4.2.2, and customer service representative prosecution
4.2.3. Following, the strategies and their known effects on the MMORPG
economies and their in-game market prices will be described in detail.
4.2.1 Central Planning
Central planning is a strategy where the planning authority tries to
presume and to match the input-output ratio and the production-
consumtion market equilibrium for each commodity. (Butterworth, 1994,
p.149) Applied to MMORPGs, a closed economy is laid out within the
MMORPG world that is internally consistent. An MMORPG economy
is designed where raw materials, currency units, and other economy-
related quantities are fix. Upon destruction of commodities, their base
1 A strategy that pharmaceutical companies are still accused of today.
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resources are returned to the economy to keep the fixed resource pool
within the online game world stable. (Bartle, 2003, p.265)
A working closed MMORPG economy achieved through central plan-
ning could, according to Bartle, lead to several benefits: prevention of
inflation, control of the prices by the market forces, and an economy-
driven gameplay. (Bartle, 2003, p.266) If the amount of available re-
sources within a central planned in-game economy is fix, every change
in prices should then solely be based on supply and demand changes
within the player community.
Central planning was attempted in Ultima Online2. Any in-game com-
modity consisted of a fixed amount of basic resources. Upon decay
or breakage, the item’s resources were returned to the economy. Raw
materials could be acquired by harvesting resource nodes or by hunt-
ing certain creatures within the UO game world. Players could sell
their crafted and obtained commodities to other players through non-
player character vendors for prices set by themselves. The NPC vendors
charged a fee for each transaction and quit the game world if they
were not paid enough. Gold entered the economy through sales to
NPC vendors and looting creatures. Gold and items left the economy
through decay, consumables3, NPC shopkeepers, and botched manu-
facturing. The overall economic design was completely based on basic
macroeconomic rules. (Simpson, 1999, Ch.4, cf. figure 1)
The anticipated player behavior, however, turned out to greatly differ-
entiate from the actual economic behavior of the Ultima Online users.
UO’s economy was soon highly deflated due to large overproduction
of goods. Regardless of market existence, players kept crafting and
acquiring raw materials. The players did not only craft and adventure
to sell their goods but, as skills improved through use, rather to expand
their avatar capital. Independent of flooding the market with acquired
goods and thus reducing prices, the users even expected to make a
profit for their labor regardless of the market conditions. (Simpson,
1999, Ch.5)
Consequently, the shopkeeper economy failed. Designed as budget-
constrained supply and demand simulators in the beginning, the NPC
vendors ended up buying everything. They basically printed gold as
they bought and sold commodities that were not backed by in-game
market demand. That way, NPC vendors went broke, as they had no
money left for actual market demand. The supply of the few items
players really wanted was soon controlled by few but very powerful
player guilds. Instead, players used the NPC vendors as safe deposits
for their acquired commodities. (Simpson, 1999, Ch.5)
The in-game markets were also highly deflated: resources were stored
by the players, instead of floating back into the economy through
decay and usage. Raw resources thus dried up in availability and
were very scarce. Consequently, players focussed on crafting could not
further expand their avatar capital, got bored and complained about
their economic situation within the game. They, however, also showed
2 Released in 1997 by Origin Systems.
3 Commodities with a limited amount of uses, e.g. healing potions, bandages, or hunting
traps.
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Figure 1: UO Original Economic Flow. (Simpson, 1999, Ch.4)
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Figure 2: UO Revised Economic Flow. (Simpson, 1999, Ch.5)
high resistance towards anti-hoarding4 policies like taxation or capital
good depreciation. Even though it endangered the health of the closed
economy, players apparently liked hoarding and used their obtained
goods for decoration, speculation, or status symbol purposes. (Simpson,
1999, Ch.5, cf. figure 2)
UO’s economy was further devastated through the exploit of counterfit-
ting bugs, program code errors that, if abused, allowed duplication of
in-game commodities. The market was flooded with in-game money,
which caused hyperinflation. After the bugs were fixed, many play-
ers migrated to new non-inflated UO servers. Even the hyperinflated
servers were not completely devastated economic-wise, however, be-
cause the highest quality items obtainable within the game were not
purchasable with gold. (Simpson, 1999, Ch.5)
Overall, the central planning strategy to enforce price control in Ultima
Online did not work at all. Central planning is very hard to balance,
highly sensitive to bugs, and instead of accepting it, players will rather
try to gouge this economy model. (Bartle, 2003, p.266) Butterworth adds
4 The massive accumulation, collection, and storage of in-game resources, materials and
commodities, preventing their circulation within the player-to-player economy.
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that direct control in general is impossible to implement. Due to too
much information problems, uncertainty and unforseeable eventualities,
the previously arrayed plans become infeasible, and shortages will arise.
(Butterworth, 1994, p.148) The UO designers anticipated a certain player
behavior and adapted their economic ruleset to those assumptions.
When they found out that their users did not abide by that economic
system, it was already too late to react.
4.2.2 Faucet / Drain System
As a closed economy model within the game did not lead to the desired
results, an open economy has been established within Ultima Online and
many other MMORPGs. This is an economy where in-game resources
enter and leave the system with no prescribed relationship between each
other. A certain amount of raw materials and in-game commodities
regularly pours into the game world via the resource faucet, and a
certain amount leaves the economy via the drain. (Bartle, 2003, p.265)
That way, the MMORPG economy is based on a system of automated
inputs and outputs. The in-game economy is designed in such a way
that an average player can accumulate a reasonable amount of in-game
commodities within a certain amount of time. The design effort for such
an open economy is significant. (Castranova, 2007, p.7) For example,
the rates for resource reappearance have to be carefully adjusted to
retain at least a simulated time-based scarcity of raw materials and
goods.
The players’ equipment usually gradually increases over time spent
within the game world. To retain a meaningful balance of faucets and
drains, new ways have to continuously be found, developed, main-
tained, and implemented to gradually absorb the players’ gradually
increasing income. A common solution is to adjust avatar maintenance
costs5 to the avatar or gear level. (Schubert, 2006) Within faucet / drain
driven economies, however, it is only a matter of time until players
adjust to the game and find ways to increase the faucet and decrease
the drain, a strategy where their in-game income vastly exceeds their
regular in-game expenditures. Thus, new incentives have to be devel-
oped and given to the players on a recurrent basis to maintain a steady
money and resource drain. For example, World of Warcraft refreshes its
rated player vs. player6 arena content roughly every six months, intro-
ducing new gear and resetting the previous arena season’s standings.7
This similarly applies to the introduction of other game content.
A system of soulbound items has also often been used in recently
released MMORPG titles. As soon as a player picks up or equips an
item, he is granted exclusive ownership and can only resale it to NPC
vendors, not trade it with other players. Bind on pick-up items require
the presence of the obtaining player at the time of acquisition within
the game world, e.g. when a dangerous creature is killed through
cooperative effort. That way, bind on pick-up items make personal
investment of time mandatory to acquire certain high quality goods.
5 e.g. armor repairs, stable fees, costs for regularly used consumables, or in-game bank
account charges.
6 Game content which is focussed on combat between player-controlled avatars.
7 cf. http://www.wow-europe.com/en/info/basics/arena/, Accessed 23.09.2008.
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This strengthens social bonds as certain items can only be acquired
through collaboratory effort, increases avatar lock-in effect and thus
retains subscriptions. There are also bind on equip items that become
bound to the equipping avatar when the item is used for the first time.
Genender argues that this even enhances gold farming as valuable bind
on equip items are preferably sold for in-game or out-game currency
than being used by their finders. (Genender, 2006, p.1f.) This argument
is questionable, though, as supply and demand per se enhances and
enforces trading of goods between players. Player-to-player trade is
rather threatened by certain unintended kinds of income, see chapter 3,
than in-game supply and demand of commodities.
The faucet / drain system is regularly beaten by the players through
increasing game knowledge. Players gradually learn how certain in-
game goals and resource hurdles can be met at ease. Thus, drains have
to be balanced very cautiously. If the required amount of money is too
large for certain in-game goals, especially new players may even be
encouraged to make use of game-external money sources like RMT
services if they do not wish to, do not know how to or just do not like
to overcome certain hurdles they personally receive as being too high. If
the amount, on the other hand, is too small, players may take a certain
commodity as a given by design and refuse to work efficiently at all for
that particular goal.
Overall, resource and money drains can help to reduce the amount of
money within a MMORPG’s economy. Thus far, however, they have
at most delayed the appearance of MUDflation and RMT and their
negative effects. Some time, players will find ways to acquire money at
a pace faster than it is drained from them. If not implemented carefully,
drains may even enhance participation in RMT and other unbalanced
transactions if the drains set by the game are too hard to overcome.
Another performed strategy to fight MUDflation is prosecution of game
rules by customer service representatives.
4.2.3 Customer Service Representative Prosecution
As design-based solutions thus far did not lead to the desired result,
that is in-game price stability, regulation by contract has been imposed
on the players of MMORPGs. Through the End User License Agreement,
EULA, and Terms of Service, ToS, the MMORPGs are declared private
property of their developers. Upon entering the game world, the users
have to accept the EULA and ToS, contractual laws, and are to abide to
the restrictions of their limited license of usage. (Pollitzer, 2007, p.22f.)
By EULA and ToS, unfair competition, RMT, and cheating within
the MMORPG are prohibited. (Dibbell, 2006, p.14f.) The MMORPG
operators claim total authority. Through acceptance of EULA and ToS,
players agree to a service provision with specific and explicit limits
to their in-game activities. The developers claim total control over
their game and the service’s development, adjustment, and policing.
"‘Players pay for the privilege of access and their continued access is
dependent on their agreement to abide by the code of conduct the
developer lays out."’ If the players are unhappy with those restrictions,
they may still make use the power of their wallets and quit playing the
game. (Drescher, 2008)
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The validity of EULA and ToS was confirmed by US jurisdiction. Players
are granted a limited license by the contracts which rightfully limitate
the player’s actions. The games can only be used for play, running a
real world profit-generating business through accessing the game world
was declared as violation of the game license. (Campbell, 2008, p.8f.)
Consequently, anything a player acquires within a MMORPG should,
in terms of rights of usage, be bound to the rules imposed by EULA
and ToS, the underlying game mechanics, and the rule and game world
modifications of the MMORPG operators.
By accepting the EULA and ToS, the users waive substantial rights:
within the game world, they do not own the fruits of their labor, cannot
assemble freely, and their freedom of speech is limited. (Castranova,
2004a, p.196) This particular distribution of property rights, however,
is disputed. The game world operators justify that strong limitation of
the players’ rights stating that they need to maintain the control over
the game world’s environment; that the commodification of virtual
objects interferes with the game enjoyment; and that the propertization
of game items threatens the health of the community. (Fairfield, 2006,
p.1097) There are both authors that support, e.g. Bartle, 2004, pp.5-8,
Lastowka and Hunter, 2004, pp.306-310, and oppose, e.g. Fairfield, 2006,
pp.1098-1101, the MMORPG operators’ claims.
German law is quite helpful concerning this issue as it clearly distin-
guishes between property and possession. Property by German law is
the legal right to conclude contracts about it, including legal sovereignty,
legal estate and liability. Possession, on the other hand, means that a
commodity’s user has actual sovereignty over the item, but does not
held any property rights and liability to it. (Theil, 2001, p.4) The pos-
sessors of virtual commodities thus by German law may freely transfer
their items between each other and make use of them. They cannot,
however, claim any property right to them as the MMORPG operator
only grants possession of them, but no property rights.
The main problem that arises regarding limited usage of the MMORPG
service by abiding the EULA and ToS is its prosecution. Prohibition of
certain player actions is ineffective as it are hard to enforce. (Lehtiniemi,
2008, p.21) Players engaging in certain forbidden actions, e.g. RMT,
access the game for unintended purposes. (Grimmelmann, 2005, p.9)
Technically, though, those actions are still possible within the game
world. There are contractual rules that outlaw RMT. The underlying
hard-coded game rules and mechanics, however, do not prevent or
exclude participation in it.
Many actions players perform within an MMORPG are checked and
balanced by underlying software procedures. When e.g. an avatar
shoots an arrow within the game, unavoidable routines are performed
that determine the arrow’s chance to hit based on e.g. the avatar’s
and the target’s attributes. Social issues are, as stated in section 3.5.1,
often solved by the players themselves through making use of the
rather hostile environment of the game. The game operators only rarely
intervene. Demanding a lawful behavior of the players by contract in a
wild and very hostile environment with nearly non-existant authorities
is inconsistent, opportunistic, and picky. The MMORPG designers
request being free of unwelcome but also protected by favorable laws.
(Grimmelmann, 2005, p.13)
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The game world operators could prosecute undesired activities ex
ante through hard-coded game mechanics. Instead, they seek costly
and scarce ex post EULA and ToS prosecution through their customer
service representative, CSR, staff. The CSR staff is opposed by a highly
organized profit-driven RMT industry with a market volume of at least
several hundred million dollars per year. It is not hard to predict which
of the two will win that rat race.
So far, we can conclude, price control strategies applied by MMORPG
developers within their products did not successfully counter MUDfla-
tion and RMT. Central planning was especially opposed by the players,
while the other two, faucet / drain and CSR prosecution had and still
have little to no effect on the existance of MUDflation and RMT. In
the end, there is still a real world profit to be made. If a MMORPG
developer wishes to prevent the significant externalities caused by
MUDflation, a solution has to be developed that prevents their negative
effects and existance ex ante. That mechanism, however, should not vio-
late the basic economic principles that players demand being granted
within the game through the game operators which will be adressed in
the next chapter.

5
E C O N O M I C D E S I G N P R I N C I P L E S F O R M M O R P G S
As explained in section 2.1, MMORPGs are computer-simulated. Any
activity performed is thus based on the underlying game code. The
game world operators have total control over their intellectual property
and can alter anything within the MMORPG at any time. While the
operators are almost almighty in terms of power, the players are rather
powerless within the game world: they are bound to the EULA and ToS
and cannot alter the game or its mechanics.
Real world circumstances, however, greatly limit the power of the
MMORPG developers and compensate the players for their limited in-
game power. MMORPG operators are private enterprises that provide
a service bound to the profitability constraint. They need to invest in
the development of new content, refinance their game development
costs, and refund their service provision costs. Consequently, they are
dependent on the regular return of their customers to the game world
to generate continuous subscription, advertisement, or microtransaction
revenues.
MMORPG players are customers paying for a service, and can freely
make use of an exit option. If they are not satisfied with the game any
longer, they can quit the game. If too many players leave an MMORPG
for a certain reason, e.g. because they disapprove the occurance of RMT
and the general price instability within the game’s economy, this poses
a threat to the revenue streams of the game world operators, forcing
them to react with a viable solution to that issue.
Within the game world, MMORPG operators are almighty dictators.
That power is, however, limited through the customer-power of the play-
ers. Reasonable complaints of the players have to be investigated and
must not be ignored. (Castronova, 2002, p.32) An issue can especially be
declared reasonable when it interferes with the interests of a significant
fraction of the customer base, not only a single player or certain small
in-game interest groups. Reasonable issues are especially violations of
the principles of fair competition and economic participation that apply
to MMORPG in-game societies and social structures: avatar diversity
5.1, equality of opportunity 5.2, demand for challenges 5.3, and demand
for minimum rewards 5.4.
5.1 avatar diversity
As explained in section 2.4, MMORPGs are also characterized through
shared and cooperative tasks. Consequently, certain societal roles are
relatively scarce and valuated collectively. (Castranova, 2003a, p.14) If,
for example, there are very few healers on a MMORPG game server,
they grow in societal importance and may be wooed by certain player
communities, e.g. powerful guilds. If, on the other hand, there are a lot
of hunters within a game world, only those who prove an outstanding
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play performance will be valued by the in-game player society. This
leads to player competition within the available roles and skillsets.
Through relative comparison between each other, players with a similar
skillset can exchange information and discuss strategies and tactics,
which further enhances the game’s community bonds and social net-
working within the game.
The selection of a certain role or skillset is an individual decision.
All career choices are completely self-determined. (Castranova, 2005b,
p.71f.) This also has the positive side-effect that each user can pick an
appearance and career that he is emotionally comfortable with. (Castra-
nova, 2005b, p.108f.) Real life looks are, in theory, not an issue in terms
of social bonds any longer, as discrimination of bodily characteristics
can be masked through constructive social engineering of one’s avatar.
(Castranova, 2003a, p.17) If, for example, a MMORPG user prefers
looking at a female body during gameplay, he may choose to be a
female character within the game. That also applies for users who are
unhappy with their real life job and who may now choose a career
within the online game that suits their individual preferences more.
While a low-wage call center worker in real life, within an MMORPG a
player may become the leader of a large guild or a master in the fine
arts of weaponsmithing. Bodily discrimination is however still an issue
in MMORPGs: visually more appealing and male characters and certain
skillsets usually sell for more in RMT based avatar sales. (Castranova,
2003b, p.28f.) Still, every user can choose in which particular way he
wants to contribute to the game’s society.
Those various individual choices induce a community of specialized
avatars. Healers, wizards, armorsmiths, warriors, scouts, and enchanters
share the same game world and provide each other with a large social
and economic diversity. This consequently leads to interaction and
enforces scarcity of certain skillsets, development of social and business
networks, cooperation, and shared labor within the game. (Castranova,
2005b, p.115f.) Through using synergies of individually provided game-
play values and inter-skillset collaboration, be it for economic or other
gameplay reasons, community bonds are strengthened and lock-in and
network effects of the players to the MMORPG product increased.
This diveristy can provide a rich and complex social environment. It
should also automatically move towards balance of skillset distribution
among the players as long as every role has something unique to pro-
vide to the in-game society. (Castranova, 2005b, pp.154-156) If a certain
skillset does not or cannot contribute to the MMORPG world in an
important and meaningful way, it will loose its appeal and its in-game
societal meaningfulness. A weaponsmith that cannot sell his wares
because more powerful weapons can be obtained elsewhere for very
limited effort will have to close his shop. An armorsmith who cannot
produce goods because the required raw materials are too expensive
or unavailable on the in-game market due to RMT activities will be
forced to perform other personally undesired activities. If a miner can-
not make a living because RMT farmers block and prevent access to
resource nodes and sell the ore for a price he cannot compete with,
the in-game labor invested to acquire his mining skillset is rendered
worthless. (Ming, 2001a,b) For each societal role provided by the game,
incentives have to be given by the MMORPG to perform it or they will
be abandoned by the players.
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5.2 equality of opportunity
While free in chosing their societal role within a MMORPG, players
also demand being granted equality of opportunity. Equality of oppor-
tunity in the context of MMORPGs or games in general means that all
players are granted equal starting and progress conditions and thus
an equal potential in outcome. (Castranova, 2003a, p.18f.) In terms of
the avatar production function, avatar capital, gear, general gameplay
ruleset, and resources have to be equally provided for all avatars at
their individual game start. (Castranova, 2005a, p.8) This does not mean
that each societal role should solely by own means make the same
earnings within a certain amount of time. Due to the diverse skillsets
and according strengths and weaknesses, as explained in the previous
section, collaboration is a vital part of the gameplay within shared
MMORPG environments. Consequently, different strategies to maxi-
mize one’s individual avatar production function can be provided by
the game. All characters that discover their optimal in-game strategy of
income generation, however, should be granted an equal or comparable
wage.
For example, an avatar choses to become a highly proficient geologist
that can identify and find valuable ores within the game world. In order
to maximize the outcome of his skillset, he cooperates with a miner
and an armorsmith. It is mutually agreed to that the earnings of their
collective labor are equally shared. As all three of them are not very
proficient in terms of self-defence, they also hire a few player-controlled
warrior mercenaries in exchange for crafting them all new valuable
armor upon return to the safe city walls. Without this combination
of the individual skillsets, the geologist would have been killed in
the wilderness or may at most have found a few low- to mid-quality
resource nodes that he could not have exploited by own means. Instead,
all parties participating in the cooperative activities could make use
of their individual skillset in an efficient way as they were collectively
combined to obtain high quality in-game commodities.
As equality of opportunity is very hard to assure, skillsets and content
within MMORPGs are continuously updated and balanced by the game
developers. Due to the high switching and sunk costs for their avatars,
the continuous process of balancing and skillset readjustment often
leads to a loss in well-being of individual players without compensation.
(Castranova, 2003a, p.25), (Castranova, 2005b, p.152) In the long term,
however, Castranova argues that avatar wages will automatically equate
through population shifting: if one skillset proves to be more profitable
than other skillsets, players will shift over to that career. That increases
the supply of that specific career’s skillset, reducing its price and
societal importance. Consequently, other skillsets are more scarce and
thus become more rewarding in terms of avatar wage. (Castranova,
2003a, pp.22-24)
Equality of opportunity is especially important as it prevents claims of
the customers against the authorities and thus the MMORPG operators.
If equality of opportunity is provided, players are responsible for their
own well-being. If they are not happy with their individual earnings,
they will need to work harder or find strategies to maximize personal
avatar efficiency. If grotesque inequality still occurs it is sufferable as
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the opportunity to close the gap to other players exists for all players.
(Castranova, 2005a, p.8f.) Within MMORPGs, that sort of inequality
is even glorified. (Castranova, 2005b, p.113f.) As avatar capital, gear,
resources, general earnings, and chances to advance and prosper were
equal upon entering the game world, personal in-game wealth can be
used to compare one’s relative personal status, skill, and game knowl-
edge to other players. If said geologist someday wanders around in
the MMORPG’s in-game capital city dressed in the finest available rai-
ments and equipped with the most proficient geology tools, apprentice
geologists can gaze at him in awe and are even provided a goal to work
for within the game world. Equality of opportunity also provides an
escape clause: if a player’s previous avatar struggles for acceptance
within a MMORPG in-game community, he may create a new avatar
for a fresh start. (Castronova, 2001, p.17)
This is, of course, only the case if equality of opportunity is, at least to
a certain degree, guaranteed. If e.g. RMT occurs, an avatar’s wealth is
no longer a viable indicator for a player’s success within the MMORPG:
it is intransparent to other players whether that wealth was acquired by
in-game or by out-game means. Ironically, even gold farmers demand
equality of opportunity within MMORPGs as they see their ’regular’
business threatened by exploiters of game bugs and macroers. (Dibbell,
2006, p.126, 197, 291), (ConcernedEQ, 2006)
It is important to not mix up equality of opportunity with equity or
egalitarism. The later is incompatible with efficiency, Butterworth, 1994,
p.48, and would thus remove all incentives of efficient gameplay. Those
incentives for play are also critical for the players. While they demand
equality of opportunity in terms of the different available skillsets, they
insist on seizing that opportunity by own means.
5.3 demand for challenges
As online game worlds are computer-simulated, they could, in theory,
provide an utopian environment where anything can be acquired at
little to no effort. Those game worlds, however, were rejected by the
players in the past. As long as equality of opportunity is provided,
MMORPG users prefered constraining game worlds over those that set
them free. (Dibbell, 2006, p.41)
This preference does not correspond with real life behavior. In the real
world, people cannot have everything they want. To maximize their
utility function, they pay to have constraints removed. Alleviating their
limitations increases their happiness. The demand for gaming time
differs in that matter. Within games, people pay to have reasonable
constraints imposed on them. Consequently, utility and demand within
MMORPGs have to be modified compared to real world utility and
demand assumptions. People do things that make them happier. Within
games, that is confronting and overcoming challenges. (Castronova,
2002, p.16f.) Those challenges not necessarily have to be set by the
online game itself, e.g. through quests or encounters of dangerous
monsters. (Dibbell, 2006, p.150) As described in the previous geologist
example, goals and challenges can also be set by the players, e.g. the
collaborative planning of activities or trying to catch up to friends in
terms of avatar capital and gear within a certain amount of time.
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Overcoming a challenge indicates to a player that he has become more
powerful. For each personal goal accomplished, the continuous sense
of achievement adds up to a gradual advancement of the player’s
avatar. Consequently, avatar capital, proficiency of play, gear, and game
knowledge are gradually increased the more challenges are mastered.
(Castranova, 2005b, pp.110-112) Challenges set goals for the players. If
there are no goals, there are no incentives for the players to strive for
advancement and thus to take part in the game world. The gradual
accumulation of power is a central MMORPG aspect as it unlocks access
to even harder challenges. (Burke, 2002, pp.2-4) It also gives a sense of
domination as obstacles that were previously too hard to accomplish
can now be completed with ease. Within MMORPGs, players experience
the archetypal hero’s journey: they progress towards acceptance by the
game world and its society by some stated in-world measure, e.g.
avatar experience or level. That way, they are told how they stand in
the virtual world, to other players, and to their past and future in-game
selves. (Bartle, 2004, p.14) As explained in 5.2, all players start with
very meager equipment and a rather underdeveloped skillset. Through
overcoming challenges and advancement, they can undergo a satisfying
rags-to-riches journey.
The evolving achievement hierarchy between the players can further be
validated through the implementation of risk and danger within the
game world. (Castranova, 2005b, p.114f.) Risk of loss of commodities,
valuable time, or even the avatar’s life are usually enforced through the
provision of a wide-spread anarchy and social instability, e.g. through
wartime scenarios and an overall dangerous environment. Besides
logging off the game world, only a few spots within the MMORPG, e.g.
cities and encampments, provide shelter to the players. (Castranova,
2005b, p.212) That way, other variables of the avatar production function
than available time grow in importance as they provide a measurement
on the efficiency of play of a MMORPG user.
That players demand solvable problems also implies that they resent
impersonal restrictions they cannot overcome. (Dibbell, 2006, p.89) The
protection of the overall achievement hierarchy is crucial to them. For
example, both in-game and out-game taxation of virtual commodities
would pose a threat to the players’ avatar production function with a
variable they cannot influence by own system-internal means. This is
also the case for game-external real money trade and other unbalanced
transactions. Any transaction of MMORPG valuables that is not backed
by an in-game investment and effort violates the achievement hierarchy
between the players. The avatars, as illustrated in section 2.5, are repre-
sentations of the virtual self, they bear all achievements of an individual
player within the MMORPG. If they or parts of them are sold for real
money, the achievements of the single avatars are undermined, and
individual successes are cheapened. (Bartle, 2004, p.15) If RMT exists
within a MMORPG, the avatar status does not solely represent the
in-game achievements and thus in-game wealth accomplished by the
player, but also the game-external real world wealth of the user behind
the avatar. That way, equality of opportunity between the players is
violated, and in-game achievements and advancements devalued.
Players demand challenges under the conditions equality of opportunity
and free choice of diverse skillsets. They, however, also demand that
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they are at least to a certain degree rewarded for overcoming challenges,
independent of the economic relevance of their in-game activities.
5.4 demand for minimum rewards
Sections 5.1 to 5.3 thus far lead to the assumption that MMORPG
players desire a free market economy as that market structure in theory
provides diversity, equality of opportunity, and a challenge. Within a
free market, everybody has to deal with the challenging necessity to
survive. Also, everybody can strive for economic wealth through free
choice of profession. Equality of opportunity, in theory, is provided as
everyone starts with very limited skillsets. As in the real world, however,
certain skillsets are judged more valuable than others by certain in-
game communities. E.g., some game servers are in the particular need
for healers, alchemists, or cartographers while there is excess supply in
other professions or skillsets.
Aside from that, a free market would not comply with the players’ real
life background. MMORPGs are typically played by citizens of indus-
trialized nations, the majority of the players are employees. Their jobs
are so specialized that their particular contribution to the production
and sales of their employer’s products can only vaguely be determined.
Instead, they receive a regular income which amount is dependent on
the evaluation of their workforce through their supervisors and their
employment contract. Within MMORPGs, the players have almost total
and self-determined control over their activities, their acquisitions, their
products, and their added value. All MMORPG in-game economy par-
ticipants are basically entrepreneurs. Due to their real life background,
most players are not capable of handling that entrepreneurial risk. This
was shown when Ultima Online was introduced with a free market
economic design. Independent of the actual market conditions and the
supply and demand based market equilibria, players expected making
a profit for their labor. (Simpson, 1999, Ch.5)
A completely free market also interferes with several other player goals.
If players find out that they cannot sell their subjectively undervalued
crafted and obtained wares, this causes economic frustration. Depen-
dent on the gameplay preferences of the according players, they may
quit the game and emigrate to other game worlds or game servers
where their skillset is more valued. They do not accept the economic re-
ality, which basically states that they are selling things with no in-game
market demand. Instead, they try to gouge the economy and exploit it
to their own well-being. It does not matter to them if what they do is
economically useless and inefficient. If they think that their activities are
poorly rewarded, they complain that the economy is ’broken’. If they
are not paid an honest day’s pay for an honest day’s work, they feel
cheated for the investment of their valuable play-time. A free market
will only be accepted by the players if it works in their individual favor.
(Bartle, 2003, p.304f.)
This attitude is further supported by the consequence-free nature of the
game. As players can make use of their exit option within a MMORPG
at any time, the severity of consequences in terms of economic partici-
pation and risk is limited. (Lehtiniemi, 2008, p.16f.) If a player screws
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up, he may as well change his in-game identity or migrate to another
game or game server for a restart.
Also, MMORPG citizens are, unlike within the real world, not bound
to spend a major part of their income on inevitable expenditures, e.g.
for food, rent, electricity, or insurances. There is no cost of living that
absorbs their income to a great extent. (Hastings, 1999) If avatar main-
tenance costs are imposed on them, they usually find a way to increase
their in-game income to an extent that greatly outnumbers their daily
expenditures, 4.2.2. Consequently, consumption within MMORPGs
is predominantly used for social aspects, for increasing one’s social
standing in relative comparison to others. (Lehtiniemi, 2008, p.36)
The conversion of completed tasks into one comprehensive measure-
ment, a characteristic that currency serves, is very helpful to compare
the outcome of the players’ activities between each other. That way,
achievements and advancements can be measured through an observ-
able global rating. (Castranova, 2005b, p.177f.) If players cannot convert
the outcome of their invested time into a comparable and precise mea-
sure like currency, it will be hard for the player community and for
the developers to determine which activities are currently over- and
underrated. Thus, provision of equality of opportunity would be harder
to enforce.
For the development of a workable price control mechanism for mas-
sively multiplayer online roleplaying games, the above described prin-
ciples should be put under consideration. Equal opportunity for all
MMORPG inhabitants levels the playing field for participation in in-
game trading. Guaranteed minimum rewards ensure that albeit eco-
nomically inefficient but self-determined choices of avatar diversity are
respected. Posing solvable challenges sets goals to the players and gives
incentives to return to the game. On the other hand, the externalities
caused by MUDflation, RMT, and unbalanced intra- or inter-player
transactions should be prevented to retain the system-internal achieve-
ment hierarchy and the overall stability, integrity, and quality of the
MMORPG economy and MMORPG system. To reduce operation costs
for the MMORPG developers, the required workforce for the price
control strategy should be kept minimal. A price control mechanism
that meets these conditions will be presented in the next chapter.

6
A P R I C E C O N T R O L M E C H A N I S M F O R M M O R P G S
To warrant that all prices within MMORPG economies solely derive
from in-game resources and that they are backed up by investments
made into the system, a clear separation between MMORPG in-game
and game-external monetary resources needs to be achieved. Dibbell,
however, states that any MMORPG economy will immediately interact
with the real world economy. (Dibbell, 2006, p.43) Lehdonvirta adds
an if-condition, noting that an embargo of RMT and other undesired
activities will very likely not be successful if the online game world’s
economy makes a secondary RMT and Ebay market possible. (Lehdon-
virta, 2005b, p.8) Genender argues that untainted money is unavoidable
unless trading is not allowed at all. (Genender, 2006, p.2) Castranova
and Farmer mention that within MMORPGs, there are only markets
that were intended by the designers and that it is the designers’ job to
close the unintended marketplaces. (Castranova, 2004b, p.91), (Farmer,
2004, p.2)
Playing MMORPGs generates commodities within the game world that
are of real value to their inhabitants, real values that the users are
willing to pay real and not only play money for. If real money enters
the equation, however, as has been shown in the previous chapters, the
quality of the play money, the MMORPG in-game markets and hence
the overarching system are affected in a negative way. While there are
indeed reasonable individual motivations to perform intra-avatar, inter-
avatar, and RMT transactions (Lehdonvirta, 2005a, p.6) the negative
effects caused greatly outweigh the positive. Game-external solutions
like prosecution through EULA, ToS or law, are highly suspectible to
fraud, contempt, and ambiguous concerning court of jurisdiction and
overall effectiveness. Independent of the law or the contract, they will
be ignored by RMT enterprises as long as there is a profit to be made.
Thus, an internal solution has to be found that excludes undesirable
game-external trade activities by design ex ante. Simultaneously, trade
activities should not be hampered as 60% of the players think that
having a robust crafting system is important, and 57% of the players
enjoy making money within the game. (Yee, 2008) Also, trading should
not be complicated, as players are more likely to participate in trading
when trade usability is ensured and easy to understand. (Bartle, 2003,
p.308) A price control strategy that meets these criteria, the economic in-
game interests of the players and the financial game-external interests
of MMORPG operators will be laid out in this chapter.
According to Bartle, four different kinds of MMORPG economies can
be identified. The first is an officially non-existing economy. As players
want to exchange goods and services, instead of a formal economy with
market transparency, an informal market emerges. This is of further
importance in section 6.4. Second, there are markets with fixed prices
where objects retain their worth. If the general level of wealth within
an MMORPG increases, the relative value of items decreases, whereas
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the absolute prices are kept stable. Fixed prices however provide a
minimum income and will thus be readressed in section 6.2. Third, there
are free market economies. In this kind of economy, prices reflect how
much the consumers are willing to pay and how much the producers
are willing to be paid for. A free market economy is most desirable as it
establishes variable supply and demand player-based in-game market
equilibria. This is reconsidered in section 6.3. Last, an economic system
may be provided that the designers decide to use. If the later works
as intended depends on the appreciation of the applied market model
through the players. (Bartle, 2003, p.299f.) The last approach is taken in
this thesis, including characteristics of all above mentioned economy
models. Following, the economic design of an automated, easy-to-use
player-to-player trade system is presented. The deriving price control
mechanism is then illustrated step-by-step 6.5.
6.1 mandatory mediation of all player-to-player trade
As shown in chater 3, the biggest threat to price stability within
MMORPG markets is posed by unbalanced intra- and inter-player
transactions. They flood in-game markets with large amounts of in-
game currency and commodities causing damages to both the players
and the MMORPG operators worth of several hundred million dol-
lars per annum. To adress this issue, the procedure of the according
transactions has to be looked into closely.
To perform an intra-player transaction, the use of a mediator is required
as a player can only be connected to the game with one avatar at a
time.1 To complete a transaction between two of his avatars, a player has
to ask another player for help or use a transfer service provided by the
game. A common transfer service is an in-game mailbox where players
can write letters to each other and attach money or commodities. To
perform an intra-avatar transaction, player A can that way send money
or commodities from avatar A1 to avatar A2 and log to his other
avatar upon in-game reception to obtain the goods. This can easily be
prevented code-wise by limiting the mailbox service to letters without
monetary and tangible attachments; or by limiting the use of mailbox
attachments to non-utilizable actions.2 If the help of another player is
used, two subsequent inter-avatar transactions are performed where
avatar A1 hands out the according commodity to player B, then relogs
with avatar A2 to pick up the temporarily deposited commodity from
player B.
Inter-player transactions are required for all unbalanced inter-avatar
transactions, be it in-game donations or RMT based transactions. Con-
cerning RMT, the customer of such a service ex ante transfers real money
to the seller outside the game upon acquiring a commodity ex ante by
outside-game means. To complete the delivery, an avatar of the seller
hands over the according commodity to the avatar of the buyer at the ar-
ranged meeting place within the online game world. (Castranova, 2005b,
1 Unless he is multi-boxing, a process where one player controls several avatars at the
same time connecting to the game via multiple accounts and multiple computers and
input devices. Even then, however, a player needs to use mediation of his own avatars for
trading.
2 e.g. the recipient can inspect the commodity, but is not allowed to equip it, use it, or
transfer it to another player.
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p.44), (Lastowka and Hunter, 2003, p.48f.), (Grimmelmann, 2005, p.7)
The ex ante payment does not apply for non-profit transactions based
on social bonds, whereas the delivery procedure does. For RMT, real
money has been transfered in advance, non-proft inter-avatar transac-
tions are backed up ex ante by the mutual emergence of social relations.
The actual transfer is completed by one trade party giving the other
valuable commodities in return for technically nothing. (Castranova,
2005b, p.151) Handing over in-game items can be regulated by code, as
players have to make use of game mechanics to perform a transaction.
Farmer calls this process "‘gifting"’ and correctly states that allowing
this kind of transaction is a design choice. (Farmer, 2004, p.2f.)
Several design choices for inter-player transactions are available. One
option might be the complete removal of all player-to-player trade. To
convert a commodity into money that is not of use to a player, the player
would have to sell it to an NPC vendor who then resells the bought
goods to the players. This, however, would lead to several undesirable
effects. An NPC vendor does not and cannot know the actual current
market demand as it lacks the according information. Mandatory player
to NPC trade would also reduce incentives for crafters to participate
in in-game trading as their customers are then computer-simulated,
unwilling to socialize, bargain for better prices, or accept variable
demand-based profit margins. The complete removal of trade based on
the players’ supply and demand would violate the economic design
principle of avatar diversity and is thus not an option.
Another design choice could be to remove currency from the game.
Farmer argues that this could discourage hoarding and other anti-social
trading schemes, and emphasize on subjective relative value over eco-
nomical numeric objective value. (Farmer, 2004, p.6) A pure barter
economy would emerge: a sword may sometimes exchange for three
chicken or a rugged leather vest in-game, but handing over a rugged
leather vest to a weaponsmith would not guarantee the reception of a
sword. This would lead to insecure transaction conditions as for every
transaction both trade parties’ material needs have to renewedly be sat-
isfied. The according process of finding a mutual agreement is usually
time-consuming and tedious. Currency greatly facilitiates transactions,
makes them more objective and more efficient. (Bartle, 2003, p.298) It
enables the conversion of an item’s worth to a unit generally accepted
by all trading parties as a means of payment. (Castranova, 2005b, p.47)
The existence of an official currency is also desirable as it provides the
opportunity to transparently compare wages of the different avatar
skillsets and prices of sold goods within the game. Due to a currency’s
benefits, in the end something will act as a currency, even in an illicit
way, and will be exchanged for other, e.g. real, money. (Butterworth,
1994, p.4) Hence, both player to player transactions and the means of
transaction, currency, need to persist.
Yamaguchi argues that by design MMORPG currencies are local cur-
rencies, where a trading network is supported by its own internal
currency. The money supply is self-regulated by the users of the local
exchange trading system, LETS, within the boundaries of the network.
Its implementation requires implicit binding power of the community.
(Yamaguchi, 2004, p.6) The overarching economic design has to ensure
that the binding power of both the game’s player community and the
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MMORPG’S in-game boundaries are protected. Its alteration by inter-
ests external to the local community have to be prevented. It has to be
kept sure that the in-game currency can only be acquired by in-game
means and that an exchange rate and an exchange trade between the
MMORPG’s currency and any real world currency cannot be estab-
lished. The boundaries of MMORPGs are porous though as players are
free to enter and leave the online game world at any time. Consequently,
both the composition of the community and the economic interests
continuously change. The LETS community is not fix, its binding power
has to be repeatedly renewed.
To ensure that all transactions between players are backed up by per-
sonal in-game effort of both trading parties and solely based on system-
internal resources, a validation routine for every in-game transaction
has to be implemented. This task is performed by an automated neutral
middleman, a mandatory to use player-to-player trade platform.
To allow the validation of transactions, a general measure for trading, a
currency, has to be provided. (Bartle, 2003, p.308) In order to verify every
transaction, unmonitored player-to-player transactions are technically
made impossible. Each player who wants to exchange obtained in-game
valuables with other players has to put up the according item for sale
on a community-wide trade platform. The actual trading partner is
determined by an automated brokerage procedure. Technically, direct
trading between a producer and a consumer still occurs, but the process
of negotiation and determination of each transaction’s parties and each
commodity’s price is performed by an automated neutral negotiator.
This reduces information costs for both the producers and consumers,
but also renders the transaction process more impersonal. The impor-
tance of consumer-producer relationships is reduced. Trading based
on social connections and direct mutual interaction is hampered. On
the other hand, this is desirable in terms of the economic design prin-
ciple of equality of opportunity, 5.2. That way, all players have the
chance to purchase any commodity offered for trade within the game
via the player-to-player market platform. In addition, the quality of
any in-game commodity is hard-coded, as shown in section 2.1, and
commodity characteristics are usually transparent to all users.3 Thus,
it is technically of no major relevance to the consumers who they are
trading with as long their demand is met. Likewise, it need not matter
to producers who the buyers of their offered goods are as long as they
can sell their offered commodities for a profit.
The mediation of all producer to consumer trade actually corresponds
with the trading process citizens of industrialized nations are used
to. Within the real world, consumers usually do not personally know
the producers and production conditions of their clothes, their food,
their tools, and other personal belongings. The exchange of goods and
services for money through retailers is a common and widely accepted
practice in industrialized and developing nations.
Exceptions to the mandatory mediation of all player-to-player trade
will be abused and gouged to either illicitly acquire competitive ad-
vantages within the game or to illicitly generate real world profits. If
players are allowed to transfer commodities to mule characters, factual
3 Players can usually inspect a ware and are given transparent information on its quality,
item statistics, bonuses, durability etc.
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normal secondary or main avatars will be declared as mules and can be
provided with intra-avatar transactions. If avatars are allowed to send
commodities to other players on their friendlist or to guild members,
short-time mutual RMT friendships and RMT guilds will emerge. If
MMORPG operators subdue to the players’ request to enable suppos-
edly "‘cute trading of commodities for glade flowers"’, glade flowers
will become the new inofficial currency of the online game. Shortly after
the introduction of glade flower trade, players will complain that they
are unable to acquire glade flowers because all glades within the game
world are occupied by RMT flower farmers and request new glades to
be implemented into the game to cover their, due to MUDflation, rising
flower expenditures.
As all trading parties and final trading conditions are determined by an
automated neutral middleman, the according procedure of mediation
has to be looked at closely. To meet the minimum reward principle and
guarantee minimum earnings, a minimum price determination formula
is provided.
6.2 minimum price determination formula
As explained in chapter 5, MMORPG users demand being granted
minimum rewards for their in-game activities. To satisfy this request,
minimum prices for crafted objects, services, and other commodities
are usually paid by NPC merchants controlled by the game. (Bartle,
2003, p.306f.) To guarantee that all activities, independent of an ac-
tual demand, are at least to a certain degree rewarded, NPC vendors
perform consumer tasks without a budget constraint and without an
actual demand for them. Goods bought by NPC vendors do not re-enter
the MMORPG’s internal economy. That way, trade NPCs function as
vendor machines that erase virtual goods for the exchange of in-game
currency and are economic-wise comparable to a large foreign sector.
(Lehtiniemi, 2008, p.27)
The NPC vendor market functions as a first layer of price control.
The vendor prices warrant a minimum wage and thus a safety net
for all producers of in-game commodities. Opportunities to generate
additional profits are provided by the second layer of price control,
where player-to-player transactions based on free market supply and
demand are encouraged while still checked by a neutral automated
middleman concerning transaction validity.
Within the real world, all price control policies require a means of
fixing prices and enforcing their application. The objective of fixing
prices is to control inflation and to prevent undesirable side effects
like social instability and unfair distribution of welfare. Price control
policies have thus far proven to be at most efficient in the short run,
while ineffective in the long run. In the short run, they also cause
negative side-effects in terms of economic efficiency and social stability.
Efficient resource allocation is discouraged through fixed prices, and
social stability is endangered as people with more available income are
favored. (Butterworth, 1994, pp.186-188), (Whiteman, 1978, p.1,5)
These two real world short run side effects are not an issue in MMORPGs:
efficient resource allocation for the production of commodities is hard-
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coded, there are no economies of scale or optimum production quantity
levels as the production of any good requires the in-game execution of
a hard-coded crafting procedure. Second, social inequality is glorified
within online roleplaying games provided that equality of opportunity
is assured and the acquired wealth derives from in-game activities
exclusively. The short term efficiency of price control policies will be of
further importance in the next section.
Price control enforced by law within the real world has thus far been a
failure in history. To effectively enforce and control prices, additional
measures to procure supply and demand have to be found. (Butter-
worth, 1994, p.186) This helps to explain why EULA and ToS regulation
within MMORPGs have so far been rather ineffective. The additional
measures within this price control mechanism are the profit and utility
maximization strategies imposed by this mechanism. The lower a pro-
ducer is willing to be paid for, the greater the potential outcome may
be. The higher a consumer is willing to pay, the greater his chance to
actually acquire the desired commodity but also the greater his chance
to overdo and not get anything at all. This will be explained in further
detail in the following sections.
Fixing prices for authority-regulated vendors generally leads to the
emergence of a black market where the official fixed procurement
price becomes the inofficial minimum price. (Butterworth, 1994, p.85f.)
Relating to MMORPGs, the NPC vendor price becomes the minimum
market price for all player-to-player transactions. As all inter-player
transactions are automatically mediated, the player-to-player markets
are formally declared as informal black markets. The fixed NPC vendor
prices guarantee a minimum wage to all players, thus the condition
of minimum rewards is satisfied. The competitive informal but still
supply and demand driven black market, on the other hand, sets no
upper bound on sales prices apart from the bounds exercised by the
market supply and demand. (Butterworth, 1994, p.90) Any point on the
supply or demand curve can be established as the market equilibrium
point. According to Butterworth, this form of fixed procurement with
unrestricted supply to the black market is the most powerful price
control system. (Butterworth, 1994, p.192f.)
It can, however, also become a disaster if the planners of the fixed prices
are incompetent or ill-informed. If the planned price control equilibrium
exceeds the modified competitive equilibrium, all are worse off as the
marginal cost of production exceeds the price and thus the marginal
benefit to consumers. (Butterworth, 1994, p.192f.) This threat is not
an issue in this price control mechanism for two reasons: one, there
is no reason for the players to complain about the minimum price
level as it assures them of one of their basic economic requirements,
a minimum wage. Two, the mechanism enforces the generation of a
market equilibrium that is equal to or exceeds the NPC vendor price.
Why that is so will be explained in the next sections.
To calculate the NPC vendor price of any commodity, a general formula
has to be used. This eases the development costs for the MMORPG
developers as they do not need to consider vendor prices for every
single item. As previously explained, MMORPGs usually have a general
measure of progress, e.g. an avatar’s level or experience. This can also
be applied to commodities within the online game world and modified
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by other significant indicators like item quality or item bonuses.4 A
minimum price determination formula is also less exposed to inaccu-
rate item value assessment as it is equally applied to all commodities
throughout the game world.
A minimum price of course does not limit or control the money supply
within an online roleplaying game. Instead, availability of in-game
money is collectively determined by the players through the aggregated
effort they put into the game world. Dependent on the age of a game
world server and the churn rate5 of its community, the players gradually
progress in accumulation of money, commodities and general wealth.
Consequently, the relative scarcity of money and items declines. That
way, the value of virtual currency decreases compared to the value of
real currency and is thus destined to depreciate against real money.
(Yamaguchi, 2004, p.5) This however is only an issue if an exchange
rate between the MMORPG and real world currencies can actually be
established.
So far, all inter-player trade is mediated by an automated broker on
an officially tolerated and encouraged black market with a fixed pro-
curement that guarantees minimum in-game earnings for the vendors
of MMORPG commodities. The minimum rewards principle of eco-
nomic design is satisfied. The fixed NPC vendor prices calculated by
a universal price determination formula establish a solid first layer of
price control. An equally robust second layer of price control for the
inter-avatar market will be introduced in the following two sections.
6.3 player-generated cyclical trade data
The constitution of any market requires a market equilibrium, an in-
tersection of the supply and demand curve. There are two ways to
generate that intersection: supply and demand market data is either
provided by a central agency or by the participants of and within a
competitive market.
The first option is feasible within MMORPGs. The game operators have
total power as they control the underlying game code. They can create
and destroy virtual goods at zero to very low costs and thus can also
attempt to control prices. (Castronova, 2002, p.4) To avoid the anger of
the players and accusations of bias and favoritism, however, the game
operators have to precisely know what they are doing to succeed in
getting the users’ acceptance for market conditions deployed by them.
(Bartle, 2003, p.306f.) Usually, central agencies work on a very large scale
with very crude tools and very unreliable information. (Butterworth,
1994, p.161) To achieve accurate trade data, the central agency has to
invest in gathering information, which increases the administrative
burden and discourages efficiency as it raises administrative costs.
(Butterworth, 1994, p.23f.)
The costs for the acquisition of trade data can be greatly diminished
within MMORPGs as the game developers can implement datamining
4 cf. http://www.wowwiki.com/Item_level, Accessed 14.08.2008.
5 The rate at which elder players leave and new players enter a MMORPG. (Bartle, 2003,
p.224)
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tools that track and evaluate trade data. The resulting increased pre-
cision of trade data does not prevent two things, however. First, even
market equilibria that are based on past sales data and forecast are still
constructed. Independent of its accuracy, predicted trade data need not
correspond with the actual trade data. Equilibria provided by a central
agency are at most somewhat correct.
Second, once prices are controlled centrally they become political vari-
ables that producers will try to use at their advantage. (Butterworth,
1994, p.20, p.43f.) If players are not satisfied with their in-game earnings,
they can pose political pressure on the MMORPG operators, e.g. by
restricting in-game supply and demand or by threatening to cancel
their subscriptions. As the online world developers are financially de-
pendent on the satisfaction of their customers, they may feel forced
to comply to the players. Consequently, prices have to be controlled
by an entity that cannot be blamed for bias, favoritism, or distortion
of market prices, a neutral entity that in fact knows best. Within this
price control mechanism, this entity is the automated player-to-player
trade platform mediator, fed with precise supply and demand data
mandatorily provided by the players.
Efficient price control requires complete knowledge to construct the
supply and demand curve of each commodity’s market. This normally
leads to several implementation problems for price control. It is not
in the interests of the producers to reveal accurate information to
the controlling authority as this makes them subject to regulation and
indirectly informs their competitors about their cost and profit structure.
(Butterworth, 1994, p.33, p.167) If this information is not revealed to the
controlling agency, however, supply and demand have to be estimated
and are thus suspectible to prediction errors. Hence, incentives have to
be given to the producers to reveal their actual prices. The incentive
of this mechanism is the prospect of making profits compared to fixed
price sales to NPC vendors that are based on the minimum price
determination formula.
Within MMORPGs, 100% accurate information on player demand and
supply can be gathered. This can be achieved by saving all trade infor-
mation to a database and its subsequent evaluation. On the web and
even in-game, very transparent information on prices of MMORPG
commodities is already assessed. (Castranova, 2005b, p.43) For World of
Warcraft, game interface addons can be downloaded and used within
the game that gather and reveal precise data on each commodity’s aver-
age price in official player-to-player commodity auctions and inform
the user of bargain buys.6 Similar data is shown on web-only game
databases like Allakhazam.7
This data can be acquired because for any given good, instead of a
single price there is a chaos of prices. (Dibbell, 2006, p.152) Dependent
on personal preferences, the consumers’ willingness to pay and the
producers’ willingness to be paid for greatly vary. Through horizontal
aggregation of the individual preferences, the supply and demand
curve are deduced. This process is also performed within this price
control mechanism.
6 e.g. http://auctioneeraddon.com/, Accessed 15.08.2008.
7 e.g. http://wow.allakhazam.com/db/price.html?witem=22854, Accessed 15.08.2008.
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Any user who wants to sell a commodity acquired within the MMORPG
to other players puts up the item on the mediated player-to-player
trade platform and then specifies the minimum price he is willing to
be paid for. Ditto for consumers: if an offered item is of interest to
them, they place and deposit the maximum price they are willing to
pay at the broker. Following, the automated mediator calculates the
market equilibrium for any offered good and then delivers all acquired
goods to their purchasers and the deposited money to the according
item vendors. Consumers whose demand was not satisfied are sent
their deposited money back at no costs. Producers who did not sell
their commodity can either retrieve the good or reauction it. Anybody
who has ever participated in an Ebay auction should immediately
comprehend the player-to-player trade procedure.
Meanwhile, the second layer of price control is automatically carried
out in the background. As Lusk & Schroeder state, the willingness
to part with cash is higher when making choices versus bids because
choosing provides an actual certainty of getting the good. (Lusk and
Schroeder, 2006, p.26) If the consumers are forced by the mandatory
mediation of all player-to-player trade to participate in auctions rather
than immediate purchases, this should, according to Lusk & Schroeder,
result in a lower general willingness to pay. In regard to price control
and price stability, the use of bids instead of immediate purchases is
thus desirable. The uncertainty of getting a commodity also complies
with the player demand for challenges as it increases uncertainty and
simultaneously rewards acquisition of in-game market knowledge. It
also gives incentives for the players to relog to or remain within the
game until auctions periods for commodities of personal interest are
expired.
Expiry of an auction requires the initiation of a timed period. If a
fixed auction period exists, a timeframe for the automated mediator
is provided to calculate supply and demand, market equilibria, and
determine actual completed transactions. It is vital to the automated
mediator that the immediate satisfaction of personal needs is impossible.
The individual preferences of the consumers and producers within
an auction period are required to accurately determine the market
equilibria. Thus, the opportunity to place buyout prices like on Ebay
or current MMORPG auction houses has to be excluded. This is also
helpful to prevent RMT and intra-avatar transactions because RMT
sellers and players cannot arrange events where the seller places an
auction at an arranged time for a low buyout price which the buyer
immediately pays.
As buyouts are prevented code-wise, the delivery of an item cannot be
guaranteed. (Farmer, 2004, p.11) Instead, all acquired goods and the
deposited money are sent to their buyers and sellers not until a trade
cycle has expired. As the expiry of a trade period is required for any
trade to take place, equality of opportunity is assured and enforced:
anybody interested in buying a certain commodity has the chance to
actually acquire it. As all player-to-player trade has to be performed via
the trade platform, 6.1, that equality of opportunity applies to every
commodity traded between two players.
As explained in section 6.2, price control is, if at all, only efficient in
the short run. (Butterworth, 1994, pp.186-188) This is actually achieved
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through time-limited trade cycles. After a trade cycle has expired, the
market for each commodity is reset to its initial status, the controlled
first layer of price control, an NPC vendor price automatically calculated
through a global formula. To determine the next market equilibrium,
each offered commodity has to be newly fed by players’ supply and
demand data. Data of previous equilibria has technically no influence
whatsoever on the subsequent trade cycles. This further asserts equality
of opportunity as participation in previous trade activities is technically
irrelevant to the renewed trade cycle. Previous participation in player-
to-player trade via this price control mechanism, however, increases a
player’s in-game market knowledge, further improving his avatar pro-
duction function value and his chance to acquire desired commodities
based on trading experience.
6.4 intransparency of information
As explained throughout section 6.1 and 6.3, a neutral mediator gathers
the relevant trade data within a limited timeframe and susequently
distributes the deposited goods and money to the determined trade
partners. All transactions are based on the individual preferences of the
producers and consumers that are aggregated to a market equilibrium
for each commodity. To ensure that the designated prices are accurate,
it has to be kept sure that they are not, or not significantly, alterated.
Subjects draw inferences about the quality or other characteristics
of a commodity through the acquisition of new information about
it. (Harrison et al., 2004, p.130) For example, a thief player within a
MMORPG is looking for a new cloak. The "‘Cloak of Shadows"’ raises
his attention, as it supposedly provides bonuses for pickpocketing his
fellow in-game citizens. Telling a guildmate about the offer, he learns
that the cloak’s color is bright red and rather helps to detect thiefs than
remain undetected. Accordingly, the thief player’s willingness to pay
for the cloak rapidly drops. Affiliated beliefs about the characteristics
of a commodity can be excluded ex ante by revealing all available
information on the characteristics of a product, e.g. item quality, rarity,
looks, item bonuses, and durability. As all items and their characteristics
within MMORPGs are hard-coded, fix, and can at most be altered
by visible enhancements8, this can easily be accomplished. Through
transparent provision of item characteristics, players can then base their
offers and bids on exact and unadulterated product information.
Individuals also tend to adjust their valuations of commodities when
their price confidence is changed or when they learn about the willingness-
to-pay of other users. (Harrison et al., 2004, p.129) For example, a smith
avatar needs a "‘dragon scale sledgehammer"’ because it would allow
him to craft very valuable dragon scale armor. The monopolist supplier
of the according sledgehammer learns about this and places a highly
overpriced offer for this rare item on the mediated player-to-player
market platform. The smith yields to the price even though his initial
willingness to pay was at most half of the demanded price. Affiliated
beliefs about other players’ or own preferences can at least partly be
excluded. To avoid effects of affiliated beliefs, sealed bids can be used
to keep producer prices and player bids undisclosed to the traders.
8 e.g. enchantments, talismans, or armor kits.
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(Harrison et al., 2004, p.136) Therefore, as players do not know about
the producer prices or the willingness to pay of other users, they in-
stead place prices that are primarily based on their personal evaluation.
Players may still exchange information on personal bids and prices
between each other via communication channels. It is unlikely, though,
that a player can acquire all trade information on a desired commodity
as collecting the according information would be very time-consuming
and unreliable.
The second layer price control mechanism reveals all product informa-
tion to the producers and consumers. Information on prices, bids, and
quantities based on the individual preferences of other users, on the
other hand, is kept undisclosed. Instead, producers and consumers are
told the NPC vendor price determined by the minimum price deter-
mination formula. That way, the consumer bids and producer offers
become affiliated with the NPC vendor price. Both the minimum price
of each supplier and the bid of each consumer have to be equal to or
greater than the NPC vendor price, else the offer or bid is not accepted
by the automated mediating player-to-player sales auctioneer.
This is backed by Lusk & Schroeder and Bettmann et al.: prices be-
come affiliated with information available to bidders, e.g. store prices
of similar goods or posted prices of multiple bidding rounds. The con-
sumers are affected by these framing effects, tend to accept them and
adjust the decision on their individual preference accordingly. (Lusk
and Schroeder, 2006, pp.17-20), (Bettman et al., 1998, p.208) By revealing
the NPC vendor price to the producers and consumers, the decision of
the trading parties is limited to a simple choice, that is how much their
personal willingness to pay or willingness to be paid for exceeds the
first layer price control market conditions.
As the individual prices and bids of the trade partners are kept undis-
closed, there is also no need to reveal the avatar identity of the con-
sumers and producers. It does not matter to the neutral mediator who
sells what to whom, as it automatically distributes the commodities and
money to the determined trade parties. It need not necessarily matter
to the producers and consumers who they are trading with:
• their trade partners are automatically designated by the mediator,
• all valid transactions are performed in a way that conforms to
their individual preferences,
• validated consumers get their desired item, validated producers
at least obtain their set price.
More and detailed information on how the validity of a transaction is
determined will be given in section 6.5.
Certain information remains unknown to all players until the trade
cycle is complete when the actual trade partners and individual offers
and bids are kept undisclosed. As long as the auction period lasts,
noone knows if their offer or bid will be fulfilled and how many offers
and bids were placed in total. (Farmer, 2004, p.12) After trade cycle
completion, trade participants with invalid offers and bids vaguely
know that their individual preference was either too pretentious or too
greedy. Consumers of valid transactions are revealed their personally
paid price, but not who they traded with and to which prices other
58 a price control mechanism for mmorpgs
validated transactions were executed. Producers of valid transactions
are informed about their actual profit. No producer receives less than
he was willing to be paid for and no consumer pays more than he was
willing to pay. Consequently, no validated trader is worse off. Players
with invalidated bids and offers are also not worse off as their deposited
money and goods are retrieved at no costs.
Two groups of persons, however, are worse off. One, customers and
suppliers of RMT and intra- or inter-avatar unbalanced transactions.
According to Farmer, the completion of this kind of transaction requires
that the seller can guarantee and confirm the delivery of a commodity,
that both the seller and buyer believe the above can be met, and that
the commodity’s value exceeds the transaction costs. (Farmer, 2004,
p.11) There is no way to ex ante guarantee the delivery of an ex ante
agreed-to player-to-player transaction within this mechanism because
the trading parties do not know who they are trading with and to
which trade conditions the transaction will occur. A transaction may be
confirmed after the expiry of a trade cycle, but then there is no need
for the buyer to pay real currency units for its completion ex post as the
transaction was already validated within and by the MMORPG, backed
up by personal in-game effort that was required to place and deposit
the according validated bid.
Two, real world governments. As previously explained, by guaranteeing
a calculated minimum NPC vendor price but enabling player-to-player
trade, an inofficial black market is constituted. Black markets have
a high level of secrecy. Many isolated trade events at concealed and
different prices are performed. Due to the lack of information on the
market equilibria, an official market is not constituted. Because indi-
vidual transactions cannot be influenced, market analysis is nighly
impossible and irrelevant. Nevertheless, black markets are stable and
well-organized. The dispersion of information on prices is as good or
even better than in a free market economy. (Butterworth, 1994, p.43)
Still, in-game prices reflect the actual preferences and valuations of
the MMORPG inhabitants. As these values are real, governments may
become interested in the taxation of virtual items and currencies. There-
fore Yamaguchi urges "‘to better denominate values in virtual worlds
in a unit that is unique to the virtual world"’. (Yamaguchi, 2004, p.7)
Due to the black market structure and the composition of the second
layer price control mechanism, trade data has only short-term and no
long-term validity and is immediately negligible after each trade cycle
completion. There is no way to calculate a commodity’s value over a
time period greater than the trade cycle’s length. The actual equilibria
are not revealed and previous trade cycles technically have no influence
whatsoever on the current trade cycle’s price. Item values cannot be
denominated into a real-world based measurable unit. An e.g. RMT-
based currency exchange rate cannot be established as official supply
and demand driven markets for commodities are not constituted. At
most individual, no general trade information, can be gathered. What
cannot be denominated cannot be taxed.
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6.5 step-by-step demonstration of the mechanism
What so far remains unclear is how the mediator determines the validity
of a transaction and how matching trade partners are found. This
procedure will be described in this section step-by-step.
Every recurrent procedure requires an initialization. Within this price
control mechanism, this is the start of each trade cycle. Each trade cycle
lasts 24 hours to make sure that all players can, independent of their
usual day-to-day playtime, participate in an auction. All auctions are
started simultaneously, e.g. at 3 a.m., to make sure that users cannot
link a certain auction to a certain seller through the timestamp of trade
initilization. That way, intransparency of information is maintained.
While a trade cycle lasts, a commodity can only be added to its market
if a copy of it was already listed upon trade cycle initiation. This is
to prevent last minute RMT sales where a seller lists a commodity for
auction very shortly before a trade cycle ends to increase certainty of
acquisition by an ex ante agreed-to buyer.
If a player wants to sell an item that was not listed for sale upon
initialization of the current trade cycle, it is temporarily stored by the
mediating trade platform and automatically put up for sale at the start
of the next auction period. Producers can tag any commodity they offer
for resale. If an item is not sold within the trade cycle it was put up
for sale, it is then automatically reoffered in the subsequent trade cycle.
This should ease individual management of an avatar’s player-to-player
transactions and overall trading usability.
During the auction period, producers and consumers may freely modify
their undisclosed prices, bids, and quantities. Any price and bid must
be greater than or equal to the minimum price determination formula
based NPC vendor price. This enforces economic rationale: no vendor
would usually sell a commodity if he could acquire a higher price
elsewhere at no entrepreneurial risk. Traders can only place one price
or bid for each offered commodity. If a thief player wants to sell two
stolen wizard hats, the said price applies to both hats. Likewise, a
weaponsmith’s bid applies to all desired iron bars, not just one. That
way, players have to reveal their individual per unit preferences. Price
diversification and gambling is impossible.
Upon trade cycle completion, the trade mediator computes the supply
curve, the demand curve, and the market equilibrium popt, xopt for
every auctioned commodity. This is accomplished by sorting all offers
in ascending, and all bids in descending order. Following, supply
and demand are aggregated by the linear regression method. After
aggregation, all bids and all offers are dislocated horizontally until
they intersect with the derived demand or supply curve. This is to
determine a discrete and sorted order of all placed offers and bids for
each marketed commodity. As linear regression is used, the overall
horizontal adjustment is minimized.
After the market equilibrium for each commodity is determined, all
prices above and all bids below the equilibrium price are declared
invalid. The according consumers are refunded their deposits, the ex-
cluded producers are informed that a valid transaction could not be
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Figure 3: Validation of Player-to-Player Transactions
established. This accords with standard economic theory: if the con-
sumers’ willingness to pay is lower than the producers’ willingness to
be paid for, their individual preferences cannot be met by the commod-
ity’s market.
Next, the intersection of the NPC vendor price and the supply curve
pmin, xmin is determined. As all bids and prices have to be equal to
or exceed that price, it is kept sure that pmin < popt. Consequently,
the threat of incompetent or ill-informed planners of a procurement
level is prevented. The intersection of xmin and the demand curve
pmax, xmin is declared as the valid maximum price of the according
commodity’s auction. All bids pi > pmax are excluded. This prevents
price rigging and certainty of acquisition through market domination
by financial power. The maximum price is also beneficial to the goal
of price control because it keeps sure that all valid transactions do not
exceed the general price frame set by the completely player-generated
aggregated free market equilibrium. Hence, all consumer bids between
pmax and popt and all producer prices between pmin and popt are
valid, cf. figure 3.
All remaining valid prices are now sorted in ascending order. Valid bids
are ranked in descending order. The highest valid bidder and the lowest
valid price are served first, second highest bidder and second lowest
price follow, and so on until a valid transaction cannot be established
any longer. If the offered quantity exceeds the desired quantity of an
assigned trade partner, the subsequent buyer is served by the currently
selected vendor as well. The validated producers are always served
for the matched bidder’s price and will thus usually get more than
they were willing to be paid for. Vendors with a relatively low valid
willingness to be paid for and consumers with a relatively high valid
willingness to pay are privileged. Frugal producers and reasonably
generous consumers are rewarded.
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Frugality, however, also poses a financial risk to the sellers. If too many
producers quote a price close to the NPC vendor price, the gradient of
the supply curve and thus the market price will drop. Since information
on the actual demand is kept undisclosed to them, quoting a low price
may both increase and decrease their profits. This similarly applies
to the consumers. If too many of them are too generous, the gradient
of the demand curve will rise, decreasing the number of customers
served and increasing the overall average price. Placing very high bids
also imposes the risk that their bids exceed the maximum price and
become invalid. No matter how the traders decide, the market and
price conditions are collectively determined by the commodity’s trade
community during each trade cycle. If they perform relatively well
compared to the other participants of the current trade cycle, their
individual preferences will be met.
The players’ acceptance and effects of the above described step-by-step
procedure will be discussed in section 7.2 in the following final chapter
of this thesis.

7
E VA L U AT I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N
This chapter summarizes, evaluates, and discusses the analysis carried
out throughout this thesis. After a short summary of the previous
chapters 7.1, the suggested price control will be evalued 7.2. Its accuracy
and its efficiency regarding their welfare effects 7.2.1 and the provision
of stable in-game market conditions 7.2.2 and player acceptance 7.2.3
are discussed. Following, prospects for future research are identified
7.3. Final thoughts of the author are provided in 7.4.
7.1 summary
Throughout this thesis, a strategy was developed with the goal to com-
bat the severe price instability markets within massively multiplayer
online roleplaying games, MMORPGs, are suffering from. Chapter 2
introduced MMORPGs to the reader, laying out their typical character-
istics and the according implications for MMORPG-internal economies.
MMORPGs are computer-simulated environments 2.1. Any activity
performed within online game worlds depends on its allowance by the
underlying game code. That way, certain acts can not only be declared il-
legal but also excluded ex ante. This accordingly applies for any in-game
economic activity. MMORPGs are persistent 2.1, meaning they continue
to exist when users are not connected to them. That way, valuables
obtained within them retain emotions, in-game investment and effort
connected to them and thus a long-term meaningfulness and value. As
multiple users can be connected to the online game world at a time 2.3,
players can compare the outcome of their in-game labor between each
other and acquire status and reputation within the game world. As the
MMORPG places are shared 2.4, trading, competition, and cooperation
for scarce resources provided by the game world occurs. Anything a
player acquires within the online game world is condensed into the
avatar entity, a player’s in-game self-representation 2.5. As tangible and
intangible goods acquired within the game system are related to the
according avatars, an avatar production function 2.6 was derived that
includes all obtainable in-game valuables in one general formula.
This production function however is adulterated by the negative effects
of MUDflation, which was introduced in chapter 3. MUDflation is
a process where in-game prices for rare high-end and luxury goods
greatly rise while the value of rather common low- to mid-end and
intermediate in-game commodities greatly declines 3.1. While that
tendency can be justified by maximization of the avatar production
function 3.2, a major portion of the according required high in-game
expenditures derives from illicit sources. A portion of the paid in-
game money is obtained by efficient economic in-game performance
3.3.1. Resources for in-game expenditures are also, however, obtained
through in-game supporters, be it members of a player’s social network
or further developed avatars of a player, resources unsupported players
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cannot access 3.3.2. As the obtained commodities within MMORPGs are
of real value to the players, real world enterprises have emerged that
sell in-game commodities, currency, and other game-related services
for real money to the players 3.3.3.
RMT activities lead to undesirable negative effects within the game
worlds economies 3.4. In-game, time and effort invested by the users
into the game and system-internal valuable acquired by are greatly
devalued, the quality and integrity of the game system decrease. This
leads to economic frustration, price instability and complaints of the
players not involved in RMT activities. The game developers are forced
to respond to the RMT-related issues, 3.5. According activities increase
their MMORPG service operation costs 3.5.1, lowering their competive-
ness on the MMORPG market. Instead of investing into the quality of
their product to attract and retain subscribers, MMORPG operators
have to invest in RMT-related counter activities. If the executed strate-
gies do not prove successful or frustration of the regular players grows
too large, players quit the game, which further reduces operation rev-
enues for the game operators, 3.5.2. Carefully calculated, the negative
effects of MUDflation and RMT cause damages of at least $300 mio. per
annum. If the added costs and losses in subscription revenues grow too
large, the provision of the MMORPG is no longer profitable and the
game world has to be shut down, leading to an irreversible loss of all
valuables ever obtained within the according game world.
The suggested counter-strategy to fight MUDflation, price control, was
examined in chapter 4. Price control strategies performed in the real
world and the challenges and circumstances of their execution were
illustrated 4.1. Price control in the real world was mostly performed to
allocate resources to the goals of the dominant system they were applied
within. Their application could not or not easily be circumvented by
the consumers. Producers regularly adjusted their product quality to
the prices set and administered by the authorities.
These issues are negligible within online game worlds. Consumers can
make use of an exit option, and product quality is hard-coded. The chal-
lenge online game operators face instead is the mandatory acceptance
of the executed price control policy through their playerbase 4.2. Within
the MMORPG Ultima Online, central planning was tried 4.2.1, with a
fixed amount of simultaneous resources within the game world. As a
result, the in-game economy collapsed because certain player behaviors
were not put under consideration, e.g. the investment in the production
of in-game commodities without in-game demand in order to acquire
avatar skillset increases. Another price control strategy executed in
MMORPGs was and still is the implementation of a more or less bal-
anced system of money, commodity and resource faucets and drains
4.2.2. These systems, however, have to be balanced very carefully in a
way that encourages economically efficient performance of economic
gameplay while at the same time not frustrating players. The intended
overall balance of faucets and drains has thus far regularly been beaten
by the players and RMT service enterprises and at most delayed the
occurance of MUDflation. Last, rules are imposed on the players upon
entering the game world which they have to abide to. Adherance to
these rules is supervised by customer service representative personnel
4.2.3. This causes additional costs for the MMORPG operators and
only provides rudimentary procedures for combatting the negative
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effects of MUDflation and RMT ex post. Overall, a workable strategy to
efficiently stabilize and control in-game market prices has thus far not
been found.
In order to develop a price control strategy that is accepted by the
users, the players’ in-game economic interests have to be respected.
These interests were adressed in chapter 5. To ensure a diverse in-game
society, a broad variety of meaningful societal in-game roles should be
provided 5.1. While individual optimization strategies may vary, every
player should be granted an equal opportunity to perform economically
well within the game 5.2. That way, different outcomes are bearable as
they solely depend on each player’s individual skill and effort invested
into the game. In contrary to the real world, where people invest in
releaving their constraints, within MMORPGs players want to have
manageable constraints imposed 5.3. If they overcome those challenges,
they request being granted minimum rewards from and within the
game 5.4.
A price control strategy that obliges to both the players’ and the game
operators’ needs was established in chapter 6. All unbalanced player-
to-player transactions, the main drivers for MUDflation, require an
in-game transfer procedure. It has to be kept sure that each transaction
is backed up by individual effort invested into the game by both trad-
ing parties. This can be achieved by a mandatory neutral mediation
of all player-to-player trade that automates and monitors the process
of finding matching trade partners 6.1. While this reduces individual
customer-producer relationships, it enhances equality of opportunity
for all players to acquire a desired commodity. A formula that deter-
mines the minimum value of each in-game commodity guarantees a
minimum income for the in-game producers and reduces development
costs for the game operators 6.2. As market conditions cannot be accu-
rately predicted, it was argued that the market data for each commodity
should be generated by the actual aggregated individual supply and
demand of the players. To provide a means to determine market condi-
tions, a recurring cyclical timeframe for according data acquisition was
proposed 6.3. As market conditions are compiled through aggregation
of individual trade data, it has to be kept sure that information given
regarding personal supply and demand is as unbiased and unadul-
terated as possible. Individuals tend to affiliate their personal beliefs
with the beliefs of others and available price information, informa-
tion on the producers’ prices and other consumerss’ willingness-to-pay.
Thus, information on the supply and demand data of other players
is kept undisclosed to all trade participants 6.4. This should increase
accuracy of trade data revealed to the automated trade mediator. The
mechanism’s procedure was described in 6.5: prices and bids for each
commodity are sorted in ascending and, respectively, descending order.
Linear regression for supply and demand data is used to determine
the market equilibrium for each commodity. The minimum and maxi-
mum price for each commodity are determined to specify bounds for
the validity of in-game transactions. Valid bids are then satisfied in
descending order, granting additional profits for validated producer
offers that are sorted in ascending order.
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7.2 evaluation and discussion
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the price control mechanism laid
out in chapter 6, its effects on in-game welfare 7.2.1, RMT services 7.2.2,
and social-based unbalanced transactions 7.2.3 will be discussed.
7.2.1 In-Game Welfare Effects
The automated assignment procedure of offered goods and commodi-
ties described in chapter 6 could lead to some economically very desir-
able effects. Market domination through monopolists generally leads to
welfare losses. If this mechanism is applied, the amount of producers
and consumers is kept undisclosed to all trade parties. That way, mo-
nopolists do not know that they are the only provider or consumer. Even
monopolists should thus be coerced to reveal their personal preference
instead of the monopoly price or bid.
Another important factor in welfare economics is pareto-efficiency, a
term defined as a situation where after a change in allocation of goods
some are better off while noone is worse off. Within this mechanism,
after trade cycle completion
• invalidated deposits of in-game money or valuables are refunded
at no costs,
• validated transactions successfully satisfy individual preferences,
• and producers get paid at least or even more as requested.
Thus, in theory, Pareto-efficiency should be achieved when the price
control mechanism is applied.
All producers and consumers reveal their individual preferences to
the automated trade negotiator. As the according information is kept
undisclosed to all other trade participants, individually valuable system-
bound knowledge is protected, increasing likeliness that the information
given is accurate. That way, very accurate supply and demand data and
information can be collected by the automated mediator exclusively.
Prices for all validated transactions vary by customer as evaluation of
offered commodities is revealed and served individually. All market
surplus for each commodity is captured by the validated sellers while
consumers still get the utility from having their individual preferences
met. Within the validated trade frame, there are no allocation inefficien-
cies. Thus, first decree price discrimination should be established by
this mechanism and thus welfare maximized.
This, of course, is only the case if system-external interests, e.g. RMT,
can be excluded or at least greatly diminished and if the mechanism is
accepted and judged necessary and effective by the players.
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7.2.2 Effects on Real Money Trade
By the proposed mechanism, every transaction inevitably requires game
world internal investments and effort by both trading parties before
the transaction is performed. Every player-to-player transaction has to
surpass the collective acknowledgement of the commodity market’s
participants within the according trade cycle. RMT transactions, how-
ever, are usually based on two one-directional transactions. The transfer
of the commodity occurs in-game while the detached transfer of the
agreed-to price is performed outside the game. Through the proposed
price control mechanism, the exchange of goods and services for money
has to completely occur in-game. In order to acquire a sword from
another player, the buyer has to invest and deposit resources obtained
within the game. The exchange of real life surplus for in-game com-
modities thus looses its appeal because in-game surplus is required for
the acquisition of any commodity desired within the game.
This applies for both commodities and money within the game. Paying
real money to be allowed to pay an interest rate based on free market
money supply and demand is pointless as the debitor already has
to pay the interest rate in-game. It can also not be guaranteed that
the borrowed money is actually provided by an ex ante agreed to
creditor as the actual trade partners are determined by the automated
mediator. In Sony Station Exchange 61% of expenditures were spent for
the acquisition of in-game money and commodities. (Robischon, 2007,
p.5) The implementation of the price control mechanism described
in chapter 6 would render these transactions unnecessary as for all
in-game player-to-player transactions according in-game investments
of time and effort are required for a transaction’s completion.
A service the proposed price control does not prevent is paying others
real money to have them play one’s avatar to increase avatar skillsets
or acquire in-game valuables. That kind of service accounted for 38%
of Sony Station Exchange’s first year RMT transactions. (Robischon, 2007,
p.5) Making use of this kind of service, however, causes high opportu-
nity costs for their customers. In order to have others play one’s avatar,
customers of these services have to reveal the login name and password
of the according MMORPG account. That way, suppliers of these ser-
vices can get access to very sensitive personal data players usually have
to reveal to the game operators to have their subscription fees paid,
e.g. name, adress, bank account or credit card information. This data
is highly suspectible to fraud and abuse. Aside these game-external
opportunity costs, in-game problems are also caused. While having
others powerlevel1 their avatar, according RMT service customers loose
their control over their in-game reputation, status, and social network.
They may log back into the game with the agreed-to tasks fulfilled.
But they may also log back into the game after service completion
and payment, completely ripped off and with all their in-game money
and belongings and even parts of their in-game social network gone.
The accessed RMT service would need to be completely reliable and
trusted within the community, which is hard to achieve by RMT service
providers because their powerleveling actions are declared illicit by the
1 The term usually used for that kind of service.
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game operators through EULA and ToS, and because they are socially
not accepted within the game’s community.
Overall, the mechanism described in chapter 6 should thus greatly
reduce incentives and opportunities for RMT companies to offer and
guarantee the execution and completion of their services.
7.2.3 Player Acceptance of the Mechanism
The mechanism, however, also renders in-game gifting, the asynchronous
transfer of goods and services based on social connections and interac-
tions, impossible. This form of transaction, however, is very important
and widely accepted and expected in social systems, especially in struc-
tures of strong social bonds, e.g. one’s partner, families, or close friends.
These structures generally support each other with something valu-
able without expecting something specific, something measurable, in
return.
The proposed mechanism prevents asynchronous gifting. For example
if a player acquires a valuable commodity in-game that he thinks
a friend’s avatar that is currently not logged into the game might
need, he cannot transfer it to him. He might at most offer the item
on the player-to-player trade platform and inform the friend about
all personally available information, e.g. the price he put it up for.
Producer-consumer relationships also become less meaningful, e.g.
an avatar cannot contact the smith of his recently obtained helmet
to craft a visually fitting chestpiece at a discount due to previous
trade experiences. A smith, however, may still advertise his services
at appropriate in-game locations, e.g. at the smith guild memberhall
in a MMORPG’s capital city. While this reduces direct asynchronous
trade interaction, it also enhances equality of opportunity. Every player
has the chance to obtain a desired in-game good or service as player-to-
player transactions cannot be performed secretly and exclusively if the
price control mechanism described in chapter 6 is applied. All offered
goods and services are transparent and accessible to, but not directly
transferable between all users.
While asynchronous gifting is made impossible, synchronous gifting
is still feasible. Several players may still cooperate for the individual
goal of one player, not a mutual goal. For example, a geologist avatar
may ask a few members of his social network if they can accompany
him to a rather dangerous location and protect him while searching
for minerals. If they find a valuable commodity while protecting the
geologist from attacking creatures, the geologist may, for example, leave
it to his companions because of their help. That way, gifting would
require the active nearby presence of both the donor and the donee
at the appearance of the commodity, e.g. the unlocking of a treasure
chest, within the game world. That way, synchronous, simultaneous,
and active cooperative interaction could be enhanced because other
methods to collectively share the outcome of time end effort invested
into the game were unavailable. This could further strenghten social
bonds within the game world as in-game experiences and efforts to
obtain commodities are shared.
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In which way players will in fact respond to the implementation of
the mechanism, however, remains unknown until according data is
collected.
7.3 prospects for future research
The actual realization of the price control mechanism laid out in chap-
ter 6 could determine if the proposed solution leads to the desired
goals, that is increased competiveness for the game operator through
decreased costs of service provision and increased stability and quality
of the in-game economic system and price stability within the game’s
economy.
In order to obtain comparable and significant data, two different game
servers could be set up. The price control mechanism is activated on
one server while not activated on the other. That way it is ensured that
all else but how player-to-player transactions are executed is equal and
other factors are minimized. Subsequently, trade data of both game
servers is collected and compared with each other. If MUDflation occurs
on the server where the price control mechanism is not activated while
in-game market prices remain stable on the other server, the effective-
ness of the suggested price control strategy could be confirmed.
This general procedure of compairing collected data of two game
servers where all but one system condition or structure are equal can
be reapplied for numerous other tests. For example, different rates for
the provision of resources and raw materials could be compared to
identify a rate of re-appearance that enhances economic gameplay. The
impact of increased NPC vendor prices on basic resources could be
determined. Different models of resource provision could be compared.
Opportunities for the collection of very unbiased empirical data are
innumerous.
Overall, the comparison of different models via the use of two online
game worlds where all but the examined condition are equal could
provide a very powerful tool for research in many different branches
of economics, business studies, and social science. It has to be pre-
vented, however, that the according acquired data is as unbiased as
possible. A solution how the integrity of the according system regarding
game-external economic interests could be preserved, was presented
throughout this thesis.
7.4 final thoughts
Many other questions remain unanswered. A potential solution to stabi-
lize economies within online game worlds has been presented through-
out this thesis. This mechanism may achieve a politico-economic goal:
price stability, the main goal of monetary policy within the European
Union in order to prevent the negative effects of inflation and deflation
within an economic system. There are, however, no politics involved
within this mechanism, just clear rules of trade participation within
MMORPG economies. The political agents who could be blamed for un-
desired and subjectively broken market conditions are the participants
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of each commodity’s market within a limited trade cycle timeframe.
Which system-internal political structures would emerge from this
standoff?
All in-game market conditions are determined by the people who are,
within a limited timeframe, interested in the sale or acquisition of the
according commodity. There is no way for the participants of these
short-term markets to identify their individual market power until trade
cycle completion where their power is rendered meaningless again and
has to be reacquired. Still, both consumers and producers are empow-
ered: they both have the collective means to change market conditions
towards their will while at the same time individual power has to be
renewedly collectively acknowledged. Long-term market power cannot
be acquired, but each market participant’s individual contribution is
actually meaningful as it is counted in the determination of the actual
market and price conditions. There is no power but the power of the
collective evaluation of each time-limited market. In which way would
this impact market organization, market structure, invidivual market
participation, and the importance of measurable power?
Within markets where this mechanism is applied, people will not
always get what they want, because they bid too high or too low, or
their subjectively determined minimum profits were not accepted by
their potential customers. If the individual preferences of the players
are repeatedly rejected by a market’s community, will they adapt and
readjust their preferences? Or will they rather try to bend the will of
the market to their individual interests?
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